The North Korea-Myanmar Relationship: A Technical Perspective

Abstract

Myanmar have existed for years. And concerns about nuclear cooperation between Myanmar and North Koreaunderscored recently by U.S. officials such as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton-have grown recently as well. 1 Obviously, no one can ignore the possibility of significant North Korean nuclear assistance to Myanmar's enigmatic military junta. Pyongyang's past proliferation activities-most especially its secret sale of a reactor to Syria-cannot but lead to more scrutiny over whether it might sell Myanmar a reactor, other nuclear industrial equipment and facilities, or the means and guidance to manufacture nuclear facilities. When one adds Myanmar's own efforts to acquire abroad sophisticated dual-use goods that can be used for nuclear purposes, it becomes essential to determine and constrain as necessary the military junta's nuclear intentions. For many years, various dissident groups, researchers, and news reports have claimed that there are covert nuclear sites in Myanmar, including reactors, uranium mines and mills, reprocessing plants, and uranium enrichment facilities. But as far as we can determine, the evidence behind many of these claims is largely based on interviews with defectors or analysis of ground photos and satellite imagery. For instance, the opposition group Dictator Watch has published a range of sites that it says are nuclear in nature. 2 Similarly, Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner has published what he claims are a series of photographs taken in the mid-2000s of extensive tunnels built with North Korean assistance. 3 He has suggested

Global Risk of Nuclear Terrorism

“…28 To date, there is no evidence that North Korea has sold or transferred plutonium to other countries, but the possibility remains a concern. 29 Six Party Talks have failed to provide adequate assurance that Pyongyang will not engage in such illicit activities.…”