The Normativity of Meaning: From Constitutive Norms to Prescriptions

Kiesselbach, Matthias

doi:10.1007/s12136-014-0221-0

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In the past several years, some authors (Hlobil, 2015;Kiesselbach, 2014Kiesselbach, , 2020Peregrin, 2012) have emphasised that it is crucial to understand the normative aspect of linguistic meaning in terms of assessment. It has been claimed that rules of language are rules that do not tell us what we ought to do; rather, they say what we may do (or should not do), and our actions are assessed by other members of the relevant linguistic community in the light of the rules constitutive of the practice.…”

Section: Consent and Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, there has been a shift in the debate concerning the normativity of meaning. Today, many normativists do not claim that we have some categorical semantic obligations; rather, it is emphasised that normativity of meaning consists of the fact that our linguistic behaviour can be legitimately assessed form thirdperson perspective (Hlobil, 2015;Kiesselbach, 2014Kiesselbach, , 2020Peregrin, 2012Peregrin, , 2014.…”

Section: Language Games Customs and Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

Kaluziński

2023

Theoria

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In this paper, I focus on the idea that language is a rule‐constituted and rule‐governed practice. This notion has been criticised recently. It has been claimed that, even if linguistic meaning is determined by rules, these rules are not genuinely normative because they do not govern actions within the practice by themselves. It has been emphasised that one needs to consent (e.g., has relevant intention or desire) to be a part of that practice. First, I distinguish between two issues: (1) How do rules come to life? (and the answer to that question is by enactment or communal acceptance), and (2) does being assessed by the standards set by the rules require some form of consent for one's actions to be evaluated by these standards? Then, I demonstrate how, by introducing the notion of “default normativity”, one can defend the idea that there are normative practices that are constituted and governed by rules and that language is one of them.

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Section: Consent and Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Language Games Customs and Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

Kaluziński

2023

Theoria

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“…Elsewhere I have tried to show, against the contentions of anti-normativists, that constitutive linguistic norms can be properly prescriptive, too (Kiesselbach 2014). The main point was that it is a mistake to read the normativity of meaning thesis as stating that the meaning of a given linguistic sign depends on the speaker conforming to the relevant constitutive linguistic norms.…”

Section: Recap: a Normativist Proposalmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The occasion is presented by two recent articles (Kaluziński 2016, Reinikainen 2020 which criticize an attempt of mine (Kiesselbach 2014) to show that constitutive linguistic norms -norms constituting what is meant by a given sign or word -can be seen to be prescriptive once we turn our attention to the purpose or function of invoking them in linguistic practice.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On Being Bound to Linguistic Norms. Reply to Reinikainen and Kaluziński

Kiesselbach¹

2020

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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The question whether a constitutive linguistic norm can be prescriptive is central to the debate on the normativity of meaning. Recently, the author has attempted to defend an affirmative answer, pointing to how speakers sporadically invoke constitutive linguistic norms in the service of linguistic calibration. Such invocations are clearly prescriptive. However, they are only appropriate if the invoked norms are applicable to the addressed speaker. But that can only be the case if the speaker herself generally accepts them. This qualification has led critics to argue that if an addressed speaker's acceptance is a necessary condition for legitimate prescriptions (and reproach for failure to adhere to them), then the account becomes unable to underwrite actual normativity. Moreover, critics argue, a danger of vicious circularity arises from the calibration account. This paper shows that once a vantage point within the calibration practice is accepted, the criticisms lose their force. It then explores why a theorist might reject such a perspective and suggests, as a plausible candidate, implicit Humean assumptions about the proper explanation of (linguistic) action. The paper ends by sketching a way forward for the debate on the normativity of meaning in light of this diagnosis.

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Rationality, autonomy, and obedience to linguistic norms

Stovall

2020

Synthese

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The Normativity of Meaning: From Constitutive Norms to Prescriptions

Cited by 7 publications

References 16 publications

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

On Being Bound to Linguistic Norms. Reply to Reinikainen and Kaluziński

Rationality, autonomy, and obedience to linguistic norms

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