The Normativity of Automaticity

Brownstein, Michael; Madva, Alex

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01450.x

Cited by 32 publications

(26 citation statements)

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“…Regrettably, however, discriminatory behaviour can still be habitually guided: e.g. one might feel uncomfortable and step back sooner when one is talking to a black rather than a white speaker (Brownstein and Madva 2012). Although this behaviour is not directed by goals the agents reflectively endorse-i.e.…”

Section: Attentional Guidance As Habitual Guidancementioning

confidence: 97%

“…Such behaviours are guided in a thin way that nonetheless involves the agent (Brownstein and Madva 2012;Railton 2009): an agent's behaviour is habitually guided by a norm if and only if the behaviour is the manifestation of a reliable disposition to act in accordance with the norm, such that the agent is disposed to notice, feel discomfited by, and thereby correct behaviour that seems (to her) to violate the norm. 15 One example of habitual guidance is our tendency to notice when we are standing (what seems to us) too close to a conversational partner.…”

Section: Attentional Guidance As Habitual Guidancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…15 One example of habitual guidance is our tendency to notice when we are standing (what seems to us) too close to a conversational partner. Such violations of conversational norms cause discomfort, and thereby dispose us to take a step back until the discomfort stops (Brownstein and Madva 2012).…”

Section: Attentional Guidance As Habitual Guidancementioning

confidence: 99%

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Mind-wandering is unguided attention: accounting for the “purposeful” wanderer

Irving

2015

Philos Stud

147

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Although mind-wandering occupies up to half of our waking thoughts, it is seldom discussed in philosophy. My paper brings these neglected thoughts into focus. I propose that mind-wandering is unguided attention. Guidance in my sense concerns how attention is monitored and regulated as it unfolds over time. Roughly speaking, someone's attention is guided if she would feel pulled back, were she distracted from her current focus. Because our wandering thoughts drift unchecked from topic to topic, they are unguided. One motivation for my theory is what I call the ''Puzzle of the Purposeful Wanderer''. On the one hand, mind-wandering seems essentially purposeless; almost by definition, it contrasts with goal-directed cognition. On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that our minds frequently wander to our goals. My solution to the puzzle is this: mind-wandering is purposeless in one way-it is unguided-but purposeful in another-it is frequently caused, and thus motivated, by our goals. Another motivation for my theory is to distinguish mind-wandering from two antithetical forms of cognition: absorption (e.g. engrossment in an intellectual idea) and rumination (e.g. fixation on one's distress). Surprisingly, previous theories cannot capture these distinctions. I can: on my view, absorption and rumination are guided, whereas mind-wandering is not. My paper has four parts. Section 1 spells out the puzzle. Sections 2 and 3 explicate two extant views of mind-wandering-the first held by most cognitive scientists, the second by Thomas Metzinger. Section 4 uses the limitations of these theories to motivate my own: mind-wandering is unguided attention.

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Section: Attentional Guidance As Habitual Guidancementioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Attentional Guidance As Habitual Guidancementioning

confidence: 99%

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Mind-wandering is unguided attention: accounting for the “purposeful” wanderer

Irving

2015

Philos Stud

147

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“…Writers like Banks, Ford, and Haslanger are responding in particular to the upsurge of interest in implicit (unreported) rather than explicit (self-reported) prejudice, while Dixon et al (2012) primarily discuss explicit prejudice. I will not weigh in here on the various controversies about the best ways to measure, conceptualize, and predict prejudice and discrimination (but see, e.g., Madva 2016a;2016b;Brownstein & Madva 2012;Madva & Brownstein 2017). In what follows, I appeal to research on both implicit and explicit prejudice, and I believe we should draw the same general lessons for addressing both types of problematic attitude.…”

Section: Arguments For Prioritizing Structural Changementioning

confidence: 99%

A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads Social Policy

Madva¹

2016

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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This essay responds to the criticism that contemporary efforts to redress discrimination and inequality are overly individualistic. Critics of individualism emphasize that these systemic social ills stem not from the prejudice, irrationality, or selfishness of individuals, but from underlying structural-institutional forces. They are skeptical, therefore, of attempts to change individuals' attitudes while leaving structural problems intact. I argue that the insistence on prioritizing structural over individual change is problematic and misleading. My view is not that we should instead prioritize individual change, but that individual changes are integral to the success of structural changes. These theorists urge a redirection of attention, claiming that we should think less about the individual and more about the social. What they should urge instead is that we think differently about the individual, and thereby think differently about the social.

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“…For example, consider conversational interaction. In a conversation, you are guided to maintain a certain distance from your partner, for were your partner to stand too close to you, you would feel discomfited and drawn to step back (Brownstein & Madva, 2012). In other words, your behavior is guided in the sense that it compensates for deviations from the (culturally specific) standards or norms of conversation.…”

Section: Mind-wandering Is Unguided Thinkingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Philosophy of Mind-Wandering

Irving¹,

Thompson²

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

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This chapter provides an introduction to the philosophy of mind-wandering. It begins with a philosophical critique of the standard psychological definitions of mind-wandering as task-unrelated thought or stimulus-independent thought. Although these definitions have helped bring mind-wandering research onto center stage in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, they have substantial limitations. They do not account for the dynamics of mind-wandering, task-unrelated thought that does not qualify as mindwandering, or the ways in which mind-wandering can be task-related. The chapter reviews philosophical accounts that improve upon the current psychological definitions, in particular an account of mind-wandering as "unguided thinking." It critically assesses the view that mind-wandering can be defined as thought lacking meta-awareness and cognitive agency, as well as the view that mind-wandering is disunified thinking. The definition of mind-wandering as unguided thinking not only is conceptually and phenomenologically precise, but also can be operationalized in a principled way for empirical research. mind-wandering, psychology, neuroscience, cognition, task-unrelated thought, stimulusindependent thought, mental action Not anymore. Indeed, some researchers have dubbed our time "the era of the wandering mind" (Callard, Smallwood, Golchert, & Margulies, 2013). Nevertheless, because the cognitive science of mind-wandering is so young, foundational questions remain unanswered. In particular, there is no consensus about how to define mind-wandering (Christoff, 2012; Irving, 2015), although recent philosophical work on mind-wandering has addressed this foundational issue

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The Normativity of Automaticity

Cited by 32 publications

References 50 publications

Mind-wandering is unguided attention: accounting for the “purposeful” wanderer

Mind-wandering is unguided attention: accounting for the “purposeful” wanderer

A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads Social Policy

The Philosophy of Mind-Wandering

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