The Non‐conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain

Abstract

I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non‐conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke's claim that perceptual content is non‐conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over‐emphasis on the “fine‐grainedness” of perceptual content ‐a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non‐conceptual structure. I go on to describe two other features of perceptual experience that are more likely to be relevant to the claim that perceptual content is non‐conceptual. These features are 1) the dependence of a perceived object on the perceptual context in which it is perceived and 2) the dependence of a perceived property on the object it is perceived to be a property of.

Non‐conceptual Content and the Sound of Music

“…Peacocke (1992 p. 67) says that the content of visual perception when looking at 'rounded' 'jagged' mountains is 'far more specific than that description indicates'. Kelly, 2001 argues that the fine-grainedness argument is too weak. See Heck, 2000 for a different argument in terms of the role nonconceptual content plays in explaining our possession of conceptual content.…”

Introduction: Perception Without Representation

“…assessable for truth or falsity, while others take it to be, at least in part, pre-or non-conceptual (e.g. Peacocke 1998Peacocke , 2001aKelly 2001;Bermudez 2009;Dretske 1969Dretske , 1981. However, it is generally taken to be a constraint upon representational theories of perception that such content has veridicality, accuracy or correctness conditions.…”

Modest nonconceptualism: Epistemology, phenomenology, and content

“…Chapter 4 focuses on phenomenological arguments: the argument from fineness of grain and Kelly's (2001) argument from what he calls the 'situation dependence' of experience. Schmidt defends both arguments, although she points out that only the first supports the modal claim associated with Modest Nonconceptualism.…”