The new politics of energy security and the rise of the catalytic state in southern Europe

Abstract

European energy security has recently emerged as an important topic of scholarly attention. Many studies have scrutinised the political and institutional innovations triggered by the establishment of the European Union internal energy market and external energy policy. However, the literature indicates a particularly striking gap between growing research and concept development, and only recently have efforts been made to analyse this current dynamic more accurately. By focussing on the security of gas supply and liquefied natural gas development in France, Italy and Spain, and extending the model of the catalytic state to the energy-security realm, this article contributes to the empirical and conceptual debate. In particular, the article argues that the catalytic state model, which emphasises the active role of governments in a liberalised market structure and their wide participation in a networked pattern of energy diplomacy, is better equipped than the regulatory state model to capture the new European politics of energy security.

New forms of industrial policy in the age of regulation: A comparison of electricity and telecommunications in Italy and Spain

“…The first and most important finding of this analysis is that despite the rise of the regulatory state paradigm, an activist industrial policy strategy is still an important ingredient of industrial success. First, scholars should apply the "industrial policy cycle" to study state agency in influencing takeover battles in other strategic industries, such as banking, air transports, railways, and oil and gas (Chari, 2015;Di Giulio, 2018;Prontera, 2017). Since then, the global spread of neoliberal ideas and the deepening of the process of EU market integration has led to the partial or total erosion of many instruments of intervention such as direct state ownership, subsidies, and merger controls.…”

“…The evidence provided here opens up at least three promising avenues for future research. First, scholars should apply the "industrial policy cycle" to study state agency in influencing takeover battles in other strategic industries, such as banking, air transports, railways, and oil and gas (Chari, 2015;Di Giulio, 2018;Prontera, 2017). A second line of research should focus more systematically on the role of the Commission as an agent of cross-border consolidation.…”

“…The existing literature highlights the important role played by the state in favoring the foreign expansion of former monopolists active in public service sectors (Clifton et al, 2011;Colli et al, 2014;Di Giulio, 2018;Kornelakis, 2015;Prontera, 2017). Focusing in particular on electricity and telecommunications and relying on insights from the "varieties of capitalism" debate, Colli et al (2014) find that successful internationalization is conditional on close and efficient coordination between elected governments and the management of domestic incumbents.…”

“…Nevertheless, the rise of the regulatory state has not led to the abandonment of all industrial policy efforts (Di Giulio, 2018;Prontera, 2017;Thatcher, 2014b). In fact, the supranational integration of formerly protected sectors, such as telecommunications and electricity, opens up new avenues of foreign investment for the most competitive national champions (Clifton, Diaz-Fuentes, & Revuelta, 2010;Jordana, Levi-Faur, & Puig, 2006).…”

The Role of the Commission in Intergovernmental Agreements in the Field of Energy. A Foot in the Door Technique?

“…Recent literature on the EU energy policy contributes to the conceptualization of the EU in this policy area. Indeed, the EU has been defined as a regulatory state (Goldthau and Sitter, 2014), a catalytic state (Prontera, 2017a, 2017b) and as a global actor (Batzella, 2018a; Schunz and Damro, 2019). While some of these studies mention the attempt of the Commission to introduce legislation on IGAs (Andersen et al ., 2017; Herranz‐Surrallés, 2017; Prontera, 2017a) they do not provide a thorough analysis of the role of the Commission in regulating this specific matter.…”