The neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution: An EEG study

Abstract

Despite the ubiquity of knowledge attribution in human social cognition, its associated neural and cognitive mechanisms are poorly documented. A wealth of converging evidence in cognitive neuroscience has identified independent perspective-taking and inhibitory processes for belief attribution, but the extent to which these processes are shared by knowledge attribution isn't presently understood. Here, we present the findings of an EEG study designed to directly address this shortcoming. These findings suggest that belief attribution is not a component process in knowledge attribution, contra a standard attitude taken by philosophers. Instead, observed differences in P3b amplitude indicate that knowledge attribution doesn't recruit the strong selfperspective inhibition characteristic of belief attribution. However, both belief and knowledge attribution were observed to display a late slow wave widely associated with mental state attribution, indicating that knowledge also shares in more general processing of others' mental states. These results provide a new perspective both on how we think about knowledge attribution, as well Theory of Mind processes generally.

Knowledge and the Brain: Why the Knowledge-Centric Theory of Mind Program Needs Neuroscience

“…EEG and MEG) serve as powerful tools in Theory of Mind research. Crucially, neuroimaging has already begun to provide direct support for Phillips et al's central claim that knowledge attribution is more basic than belief attribution-belief attribution seems to demand neural resources that knowledge attribution does not (Bricker 2020). All this gives us compelling reason to think that the neuroscience of knowledge attribution has a vital role to play in the nascent knowledge-centric Theory of Mind research program.…”

“…Again, this evidence was not salient in their behavioral data All this provides a general sense of the value of neuroimaging in Theory of Mind research. However, the neurocognitive findings most directly pertinent to the research program imagined by Phillips et al come from my own EEG study (Bricker 2020). The first step in a broader research project dedicated to understanding the neurocognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution, the design of this study was simple, with participants varyingly judging whether a cartoon character sitting at a table knew/believed that there were two cylinders on the table.…”

Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes)

“…First, however, in this section I want to provide the other key ingredient, an empirical perspective on how the brain computes knowledge attributions. This perspective will situate pioneering behavioral findings from Phillips et al (2018) and my own EEG study (Bricker, 2020)-the first to apply neuroimaging techniques to knowledge attribution-within a broader context offered by experimental philosophy and developmental and comparative psychology (see especially Phillips et al, 2020).…”

“…My second reason is the more practical matter of what empirical evidence we presently have available to us. While the studies I'll discuss (primarily Bricker, 2020;Phillips et al, 2018) provide us with a direct look into the neurocognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution, both the Nagel and Gerken accounts were largely based on biases observed empirically for belief attribution. This seems to have derived from the tendency of psychology-oriented philosophers of knowledge attribution to assume that ''knowledge involves belief or a belief-like attitude'' (Gerken, 2012, 148).…”

“…Accordingly, we cannot safely assume that the mechanisms of belief attribution generalize to knowledge attribution-direct empirical evidence from studies about knowledge attribution is needed. As is illustrated by a number of recent accounts of knowledge attribution (Bricker, 2020;Phillips et al, 2020;Westra & Nagel, 2021), all of which eschew the belief-derived biases-and-heuristics approach, the knowledge-first program likely represents the future of this research. Finally, the neurocognitive perspective also offers the opportunity for converging evidence in a way that isn't easily replicated by cognitive psychology.…”