The Netherlands: Social Pacts in a Concertation Economy

Visser, Jelle; Meer, M. van der

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590742.003.0009

Cited by 12 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…This study uses the publicly available Comparative Welfare States Data Set (Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014). Original data sources are the OECD for most variables and the Jelle Visser (2013) dataset for two variables: union density and social pact. Variables are measured annually for 22 OECD countries from 1960 to 2011.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gendered Representation and Critical Mass: Women’s Legislative Representation and Social Spending in 22 OECD Countries

Park

2017

Sociological Perspectives

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To better understand the dynamics of representation of women’s interests such as public expenditure on healthcare, daycare, and education, this study examines statistical evidence for the notion of critical mass. To do so, this study uses the Comparative Welfare States Data Set and the piecewise regression method to produce two linear models that best fit to the data for different ranges of the share of seats in parliament held by women. The analysis fails to find consistent support for a threshold below which women legislators have little-to-no impact upon policy outcomes. By adjudicating seven hypothetical thresholds, the analysis also shows that when there is a critical mass effect, the 10 percent level is more a consequential threshold than 15, 20, or 30 percent levels. Findings suggest that we reject the idea of a critical threshold for women’s legislative representation. However, the relationship between the representation and social spending is robust with or without presumed critical mass.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gendered Representation and Critical Mass: Women’s Legislative Representation and Social Spending in 22 OECD Countries

Park

2017

Sociological Perspectives

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“…In the Netherlands the main union confederations has since 1993 issued an annual recommendation on maximum wage increases, depending on past developments in inflation and productivity, and in any given year actual wage increases have stayed below this maximum (De Beer 2013). At times of economic downturn the government works hard and is usually capable to cast a "shadow of hierarchy" over bargaining tables in order to obtain a commitment to additional wage moderation (Visser and Van der Meer 2011). Moderation of wage demands in 2009-10 was tied to government and employer support for financing temporary shorter working hours, following the successful German example in metal engineering.…”

Section: Bargaining Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

What happened to collective bargaining during the great recession?

2016

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Collective bargaining over labour conditions between unions and employers is a key labour market institution in democratic societies, guaranteed by international and national law. Its coverage, organization and impact have varied over time and across countries. Inclusive bargaining, conducted by employers' associations with a mandate to bargain, and supported by the state, received a strong impulse during the interwar Depression. In the Great Recession a more exclusive version based on enterprise bargaining appears to have been favoured by governments and international agencies. How this relates to changes in bargaining coverage, multi-employer and multi-level bargaining, rules on extension and opening clauses is the subject of this paper, which surveys developments in 38 OECD and EU countries. A distinction is made between long-term and crisis-related changes, and between regulatory and non-regulatory changes during the Great Recession.

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“…For example, employee-employer relations in the Netherlands were much more adversarial at the time of the Wassenaar agreement (1982). According to Visser and Van der Meer (2011), it was only in the decade after Wassenaar that a consensus emerged between unions and employer organisations. Hence, the pact arguably served to demonstrate to bargaining parties that compromises could be mutually beneficial and provided a basis for future collaboration and the build-up of trusting relationships.…”

Section: Chart 1 Cooperation In Labour Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective Bargaining Through the Magnifying Glass: A Comparison Between the Netherlands and Portugal

Hijzen

Martins

Parlevliet³

2017

IMF Working Papers

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This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of sector-level bargaining systems and their role for labour market performance. We compare two countries with seemingly similar collective bargaining systems, the Netherlands and Portugal, and document a number of features that may affect labour market outcomes, including: i) the scope for flexibility at the firm or worker level within sector-level agreements; ii) the emphasis on representativeness as a criterion for extensions; iii) the effectiveness of coordination across bargaining units; and iv) pro-active government policies to enhance trust and cooperation between the social partners.

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The Netherlands: Social Pacts in a Concertation Economy

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Gendered Representation and Critical Mass: Women’s Legislative Representation and Social Spending in 22 OECD Countries

Gendered Representation and Critical Mass: Women’s Legislative Representation and Social Spending in 22 OECD Countries

What happened to collective bargaining during the great recession?

Collective Bargaining Through the Magnifying Glass: A Comparison Between the Netherlands and Portugal

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