2005
DOI: 10.1080/09672550500321502
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The Nature of Transcendental Arguments

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Cited by 35 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…6 Not by chance, if Kant was categorical on one thing about transcendental argumentation, it is that transcendental proofs can never be understood in merely conceptual terms, for they essentially contain an appeal to possible experience (A782-3/ B810-1). 7 Among the Kantian critics of a merely conceptual construal of transcendental argumentation, Mark Sacks (2005) stands out. According to Sacks, as long as we take transcendental arguments as merely deductive procedures, what is distinctly "transcendental" about them gets lost.…”
Section: Transcendental Argumentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…6 Not by chance, if Kant was categorical on one thing about transcendental argumentation, it is that transcendental proofs can never be understood in merely conceptual terms, for they essentially contain an appeal to possible experience (A782-3/ B810-1). 7 Among the Kantian critics of a merely conceptual construal of transcendental argumentation, Mark Sacks (2005) stands out. According to Sacks, as long as we take transcendental arguments as merely deductive procedures, what is distinctly "transcendental" about them gets lost.…”
Section: Transcendental Argumentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To appreciate the strength of Sacks' point, take for example Kant's "argument for substance" in his First Analogy of Experience, which is one of Sacks' own examples of a transcendental argument (see Sacks, 2005;2006). According to Sacks, there is no analytic route leading us from the concept of a 'change' employed there by Kant to the concept of a 'substance' -the concept, that is, of an abiding something underlying change as a necessary condition of its representation.…”
Section: Transcendental Argumentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For one, what there is for armchair reflection to do here is contentious. Philosophers’ own aims may require empirical data and analysis (Ameriks 1978; Cassam 2007; Pereboom 1990; Piché 2016; Sacks 2000, 2005). More generally, does philosophy concern itself primarily with nonempirical stuff (concepts, words, meanings, logic, introspection, intuition, thought experiments, metaphysics), or primarily with empirical stuff, with the world itself, like science?…”
Section: Sociology and Philosophymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In “The Nature of Transcendental Arguments,” Mark Sacks writes: “Any experience must be internally structured, or articulated, on pain of it not qualifying as an experience at all: without that articulation, sufficient to distinguish one type of experience from another, there would not be anything it is like for the experiencing subject to undergo it. But saying that experience must be articulated is not the same as saying that it must be linguistically articulated, or indeed linguistically articulable by the subject in question; it is not even to say that that articulation is fully cognitive” (, 444). Concerning our current project, Sacks's passage indirectly raises a very important issue.…”
Section: Realism Nominalism and Social Influences On Experiencementioning
confidence: 99%