The nature of primary consciousness. A new synthesis

Prospective organization of neonatal arm movements: A motor foundation of embodied agency, disrupted in premature birth

“…Our observation that neonatal arm movements are a basic, primary form of intended action has important bearing on understanding the development of agency and intentionality. It stands in agreement with a growing philosophical psychological account that basic, embodied intentions are part‐and‐parcel of the core sense of self (Alcaro, Carta, & Panksepp, 2017; Delafield‐Butt & Gangopadhyay, 2013; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Fuchs & Koch, 2014; Gallagher, 2000, 2005; Hohwy, 2007; Merker, 2007; Northoff & Panksepp, 2008; Pacherie, 2008; Stern, 2010; Trevarthen & Delafield‐Butt, 2017; Zahavi, 2005, 2006). This non‐verbal modality of expressive gesture made in communication with a caring and attentive other underpins preverbal, embodied intersubjective communication important for psychological development and health (Delafield‐Butt & Trevarthen, 2015; Di Paolo & De Jaegher, 2015; Rochat & Gallese, 2016; Trevarthen et al., 2015) and, in cases where the infant's mental health or development is threatened, may require professional assistance to support (Brazelton, 2006).…”

Four-Dimensional Graded Consciousness

“…Four different gradable aspects belonging to four different dimensions of consciousness will be described; therefore, the methodological question of how to measure those hierarchies is, in effect, also in due course addressed. Furthermore, the findings presented here may ultimately help to answer certain more general questions: e.g., how science should compare and assess consciousness across different species (Griffin and Speck, 2004; Seth et al, 2005; Edelman and Seth, 2009; Boly et al, 2013; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013, 2016), or in artificial systems (Hollande, 2003; Chella and Manzotti, 2007; Torrance et al, 2007; Clowes and Seth, 2008; Kurzweil, 2012; O’Regan, 2012), and whether it is right to say that there are developmental differences in respect of conscious grades/levels over the course of the lives of individual organisms (Stuss and Anderson, 2004; Zelazo, 2004; Kouider et al, 2013). Ultimately, it is for the future to determine whether or not these results are explanatorily advantageous; nevertheless, some of their possible applications are already outlined in the closing sections here.…”

“…It seems that organisms able to utilize conscious information in order to, say, control, adapt or choose action patterns in given circumstances must have been more efficacious and statistically more successful – otherwise the ability to be conscious probably would not have survived (Lindahl, 1997; Baars, 2002, 2012; Griffin, 2001; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013, 2016). Consequently, when it comes to this dimension what we are focused on is neither its experiential qualities ( what-it-is-like ), nor its reference ( aboutness ), nor the physical processes in which it is embedded ( production mechanisms ), but rather its pragmatic function ( usefulness in action ).…”

“…All the same, the assertion that the capacity for consciousness holds rather high evolutionary value (Lindahl, 1997; Griffin, 2001; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013, 2016) simply by virtue of being useful or efficacious in certain conditions still seems justified. That view is by no means a new one, as it was already put forward by William James: “[t]he particulars of the distribution of consciousness, so far as we know them, point to its being efficacious… it seems an organ, superadded to other organs which maintain the animal in the struggle for existence; and the presumption of course is that it helps him in some way in the struggle…” (James, 1890, cited in Seth, 2009).…”

“…However, within scientific practice consciousness is mainly characterized operationally, by certain behavioral and/or neurophysiological indicators such as reportable contents, goal-directed and adaptive behavior, or recurrent processing in the thalamocortical structures (see Damasio, 1999; Crick and Koch, 2003; Edelman, 2003; Lamme, 2006; Baars, 2012; Baars et al, 2013; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013). The reportability requirement may suggest that consciousness is limited to humans, primates and a few other highly developed species (see Carruthers, 1998), but it has also sometimes been ascribed to various other – far more ‘ancient’ – creatures (ranging from vertebrates generally to insects and lampreys – see Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013, 2016; also Edelman and Seth, 2009; Boly et al, 2013). Furthermore, its scope of application has even been extended beyond living organisms (Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2010; Chella and Manzotti, 2007; Koch, 2012; Tononi and Koch, 2014).…”