1999
DOI: 10.1016/s1389-1286(98)00018-8
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The nature of a useable PKI

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Cited by 40 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…A very different approach is taken by PGP [22], where certificates define a `web of trust` and there is no central CA. We share the view advocated by many [22,4,5,9,15,1,2,14,7,17,8,12], that a relying party may not necessarily completely trust the issuers of the credentials. Instead, these works advocate a model where the relying application may need multiple credentials to make its decisions, and has a non-trivial policy for the necessary credentials.…”
Section: Related Worksupporting
confidence: 70%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…A very different approach is taken by PGP [22], where certificates define a `web of trust` and there is no central CA. We share the view advocated by many [22,4,5,9,15,1,2,14,7,17,8,12], that a relying party may not necessarily completely trust the issuers of the credentials. Instead, these works advocate a model where the relying application may need multiple credentials to make its decisions, and has a non-trivial policy for the necessary credentials.…”
Section: Related Worksupporting
confidence: 70%
“…More recent works, in particular [15,4], suggested that names should only be unique with respect to a given issuer, and do not necessarily have to have global meaning (and therefore liability). In fact, in this approach the name field in a certificate becomes just a convenience and an option, and the subject is really identified by possessing the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This advantage of R-trust is not shared by familiarity-based trust, which deals with individuals. It is true that public-key infrastructures (PKIs), provides for massive and scalable authentication of the identity and roles of principals [19,8] via distribution of certificates; but each such certificate require a degree of familiarity, by somebody, with the individual being certified. The advantage of F-trust, on the other hand, is that it can provide one with comprehensive information about a given individual; while R-trust provides just the common denominator of a class of entities, and thus cannot be very specific.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Additional components of the attributes field include the expiration time of the certificate, the URL of the server that maintains CRLs for this type of certificates, a certificate id (used to identify it in CRLs), etc. (Currently we support SPKI format of certificates [6]). What happens when the certified event is triggered depends, of course, on the law.…”
Section: The Treatment Of Certificates Under Lgimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To date, several certificate frameworks [9,6,15] and revocation mechanisms [13,14,8] have been proposed and intensively studied. What interests us here is an orthogonal aspect of certificate management, which has received considerably less attention, namely in what conditions can these mechanisms be legitimately used.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%