The Nature and Sources of the Law

Gray, John Chipman

doi:10.2307/3313710

Cited by 22 publications

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“…The second reason the answer might seem unconvincing is that when, in a common law jurisdiction, today's court develops the law by modifying the rule‐formulation of an earlier court, the new content that today's court adds to the common law is (absent a convention of prospective overruling) applied ex post facto to the facts of the case which invites the modification. Common‐law courts are, ‘with the consent of the State, … constantly making ex post facto Law’, because they are ‘constantly in the practice of applying … rules which were not in existence and were, therefore, not knowable by the parties when the causes of controversy occurred.’ If it is acceptable for a court to modify the existing common law so as to alter the legal status of an action already taken (or to interfere with a right already acquired) by a party to a case, why should it be unacceptable for a court to modify the law by relying on reasons supporting the modification which are to be found only in foreign precedents? To object that the modification would apply to facts which pre‐date the court's decision, thereby creating a legal liability which the person who took the liability‐incurring action could not have discovered (because it did not exist) at the time of acting, meets with an obvious retort: but then this is precisely how it is whenever judges develop the common law.…”

Section: The Reasons Beneath the Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Law of the Land

Duxbury

2015

Modern Law Review

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This article considers the status of foreign precedents in national courts. It examines possible reasons for courts referring to them and concludes that, absent some incorporating convention, judges cannot ever be said to have an obligation to refer to them. But it also shows that there is nothing unprincipled about national courts choosing to treat foreign precedents as persuasive authority, notwithstanding that there are some good reasons, especially in the context of constitutional adjudication, for cautioning against this. It is also suggested that no satisfactory argument can be adduced to support the proposition that a national court must never rely on foreign precedent as the sole reason for modifying the indigenous common law – though it seems very unlikely that judges would ever need (still less want) to rely on foreign precedent in this way.

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Section: The Reasons Beneath the Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Law of the Land

Duxbury

2015

Modern Law Review

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“…Positivists move the validity test more and more backwards up to a core of fundamental norms-i.e., "those ultimate rules of recognition" that are a "matter of social fact" [6]that cannot be contested lest the whole legal system be questioned. Positivists, in other words, hold an idea of law as "that which is" rather than "that which ought to be" [8]. This ex post approach exposes the positivist understanding of just or valid law to a historical vulnerability and a recurrent criticism, emphasising the attempt of positivist lawyers to justify as being valid (to the extent that they are formally correct) certain norms, laws, and policies that would generally raise moral concerns when cast against the background of (potentially) universal or majoritarian principles and values.…”

Section: The Theoretical Debate: Legal Validitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Drafting a Composite Indicator of Validity for Regulatory Models and Legal Systems

Ciambra

Casanovas

2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to lay the groundwork for the creation of a composite indicator of the validity of regulatory systems. The composite nature of the indicator implies a) that its construction is embedded in the long-standing theoretical debate and framework of legal validity; b) that it formally contains other sub-indicators whose occurrence is essential to the determination of validity. The paper suggests, in other words, that validity is a second-degree property, i.e., one that occurs only once the justice, efficiency, effectiveness, and enforceability of the system have been checked. Keywords. Validity · indicators · regulatory models · regulatory systems · Privacy Impact Assessment IntroductionThe aim of this preliminary and exploratory study is to lay the groundwork for the creation of a composite indicator of the legal validity of norms. The composite nature of the indicator implies a) that its construction is embedded in the long-standing theoretical debate and framework of legal validity; b) that it formally contains other sub-indicators whose occurrence is essential to the determination of validity. The study suggests, in other words, that validity is a secondary property of a legal norm, i.e., one that occurs only once the norm's justice (J), efficiency (E y ), effectiveness (E s ), and enforceability (E c ) have been proved. This basic hypothesis can be rewritten in a plainer fashion as:where the norm's legal validity V n is less than or equal to the sum of the four subindicators. This also suggests that the norm's compliance with all four sub-indicators is a necessary and sufficient condition for its legal validity, i.e., that the occurrence of all four sub-indicators implies the norm's validity in a regulatory system previously defined:These are not to be understood as formulae, but as simple way to convey a first intuition about validity. There are two tasks to comply with. The first one is theoretical:

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“…Desde este horizonte de comprensión de las prácticas normativas, se muestra también la necesidad de superar un enfoque de los problemas jurídicos que se concentre únicamente en los problemas lógicos o de no contradicción formal entre sus diferentes piezas, de coherencia axiológi-ca, y no contemple los sistemas jurídicos como universos autorreferenciales y autosostenidos 21 , que flotan en sí mismos con una pretensión de suficiencia que le permite incurrir con aparente tranquilidad, en su caso, en el despotismo de la ley: "el derecho de un Estado no es un ideal, sino algo que existe efectivamente (…) no es lo que debe ser sino lo que es" (GRAY, 1948, p. 213 apud HART, 1998. En esta línea, el derecho puede transitoriamente tener "cualquier contenido", salvados los problemas lógicos, como quizá se pueda sostener desde el formalismo kelseniano ["Las normas jurídicas pueden tener cualquier tipo de contenido" (KELSEN, 1945, p. 113 apud HART, 1998] al consistir el derecho en pura formalidad.…”

Section: Horizonte De La Praxis Como Marco Para El Esclarecimiento Deunclassified

<b>El ajuste o desajuste de las prácticas normativas en Ignacio Ellacuría: hacia una nueva dimensión de lo normativo. </b> <br>doi:10.5007/2177-7055.2011v32n62p15

Senent

2011

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Resumen: Este trabajo realiza un análisis sobre el ajuste o desajuste de los derechos humanos a partir de la tesis de Ignacio Ellacuría. Se trata primero de ubicar este análisis en el contexto crítico que lo anima, el horizonte de la praxis histórica. Desde ahí se propone una fundamentación del ajuste en su relación con la praxis humana, así como el estudio crítico del papel que ese ajuste o desajuste de los esquemas normativos juega actualmente en el conjunto del proceso normativo en el seno de las prácticas sociales en la presente fase civilizatoria. A su vez, se aborda un análisis de la lucha por articular otros esquemas normativos que respondan más ajustadamente a las exigencias de la justicia frente a los otros y a la naturaleza.Palabras-chave: Prácticas normativas. Ajuste normativo. Derechos humanos. Horizonte de la praxis. Ignacio Ellacuría. Xavier Zubiri. Abstract:This work provides an analysis of adjustment or disadjustment of human rights from Ignacio Ellacuría thesis. We must first place this analysis in the critical context that animates it, the horizon of historical praxis. From there, a rationale for its adjustment in relation to human praxis is proposed, as well as a critical study of the role such adjustment or maladjustment of regulatory schemes currently plays in the overall regulatory process within the social practices in the contemporary civilization stage. In turn, we conduct an analysis of the struggle to articulate other regulatory schemes that respond more tightly to the demands of justice against others and nature.

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The Nature and Sources of the Law

Cited by 22 publications

References 0 publications

The Law of the Land

The Law of the Land

Drafting a Composite Indicator of Validity for Regulatory Models and Legal Systems

<b>El ajuste o desajuste de las prácticas normativas en Ignacio Ellacuría: hacia una nueva dimensión de lo normativo. </b> <br>doi:10.5007/2177-7055.2011v32n62p15

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