The Nationalization of Japanese Elections

McElwain, Kenneth Mori

doi:10.1017/s1598240800008055

Cited by 60 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(24 reference statements)

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“…The literature on the recent elections in Japan suggests that party labels and the leadership's popularity now signiicantly inluence candidates' electoral fortunes (McElwain 2012;Patterson and Maeda 2007) and clientelism is now being replaced by programmatism (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010). Furthermore, in 2009 Japan had a government turnover through elections for the irst time in more than 60 years, because the combination of the DPJ's potential and disillusionment with the LDP government's policy performance convinced most swing voters: a poll on the 2009 turnover, for example, showed that 61.2% of voters thought party reputations were important in making voting decisions, compared to 29.0% who considered individual candidates' personal traits as important (Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyōkai 2010).…”

Section: Kuniaki Nemoto and Chia-hung Tsaimentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

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Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the coniguration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Signiicantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system-especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly-can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive ofice and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems and ind that executive competition has the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia.The indings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the speciication of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context-and especially the constitutional framework-within which such rules are embedded. AcknowledgmentsThe genesis of this volume lies in an attempt to answer a basic research question that surfaced in a roundtable of the second annual Asian Election Studies Conference held at the Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taiwan, in May 2010. Why was it that Taiwan and Japan, two similar East Asian countries that had both switched from similar single nontransferable vote to similar mixed-member majoritarian legislative electoral systems, had displayed such divergent speeds and degrees in moving toward the theoretically expected consolidation of their party systems? A brainstorm with Gary Cox during his visit to the ESC in November 2011 sparked the idea of taking into account the constitutional context in which the electoral systems operate.As with any book-length project, we have a number of people and institutions to thank. We thank the ESC and its director, Lu-huei Chen, for continuous administrative support throughout the life of the project. A book with twenty-one coauthors based in ifteen institutions spanning four countries needs some sort of institutional base, and the ESC provided that home. We also wish to acknowledge our four home institutions, the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, National Chengchi University, the University of Canterbury, and Stanford University. ...

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Section: Kuniaki Nemoto and Chia-hung Tsaimentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

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“…The situation is reminiscent of the past party system of dominance by the LDP and fragmented, weak opposition parties (Scheiner 2006). Japanese elections, especially the general (lower house) elections, have been nationalized since the introduction of the current electoral system and have shown a high level of volatility (McElwain 2012). High volatility in electoral outcomes and opposition party vulnerability has become quite a serious problem in Japanese politics.…”

Section: Research Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

After populism?

Yamada

2016

Japanese Political Science Review

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Why can't Japan have a competitive opposition? Through an analysis of survey datasets, this article shows the loss of faith in the DPJ, and the vulnerability of voters' support. Although our analysis indicates the strength of the current Abe cabinet since 2012, it simultaneously displays that there is a greater divergence in emotional thermometer to Prime minister Abe and the LDP since regaining power in 2012, which suggests conflict in evaluation to the incumbent cabinet among Japanese electorates. keywords: weak opposition, vulnerability of voters' support, cabinet approval and disapproval japanese political science review 3 (2016), 1-13

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“…His strong popularity among commoners led to his party's recovery of electoral strength, allowing him to maintain premiership for more than five years despite his weak factional bases. Party leaders' increased importance in electoral campaigning in turn results from the fact that the 1994 electoral reform has moved Japanese party politics closer to a two‐party system and pushed voters to make voting decisions based on the party rebel rather than candidates' personal appeals (McElwain, ; Rosenbluth & Thies, , pp. 113–115).…”

Section: Analyzing Causes Of Dpj's Failurementioning

confidence: 99%

Unattainable Mission? The Democratic Party of Japan's Unsuccessful Policymaking System Reform

Mishima

2015

Asian Politics and Policy

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In December 2012, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) fell from power after ruling the country for only three years. An important cause of the DPJ government's downfall concerned its failure in policymaking system reform. When it came to power in September 2009, the DPJ vowed to dissolve the policymaking system created under the lengthy dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party. It pledged to practice “Cabinet‐led policymaking” by strengthening the Cabinet's leadership fundamentally. It also promised to curtail bureaucratic power. But in reality, the DPJ's policymaking system reform turned out to be an utter failure. This article points out that there are four major reasons for the DPJ government's failure in policymaking system reform: (i) lack of internal unity, (ii) ineffective top leadership, (iii) institutional depth of bureaucratic power, and (iv) the twisted Diet.

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The Nationalization of Japanese Elections

Cited by 60 publications

References 22 publications

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

After populism?

Unattainable Mission? The Democratic Party of Japan's Unsuccessful Policymaking System Reform

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