1) ALTHOUGH numerous individuals and organisations have voiced opinions about the impact of economic sanctions on the distribution of in-come in South Africa, there has to date been no attempt to frame the arguments in a theoretical model of any rigour. The purpose of this paper is to present the outline of one possible means of analysis that can be fruit-fully employed to investigate this aspect of the sanctions problem. The approach employed is based on the orthodox neoclassical trade theorem developed by Stolper and Samuelson (1949) in the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition. The appropriateness of using this approach to examine the South African pattern of trade in manufactures and also her overall trade pattern has been examined theoretically and empirically by Holden (1981), Holden (1983) and Roque (1984) who all find support for the explanatory powers of the Hecksher-Ohlin model, albeit in extended form. According to Holden (1984) the empirical findings reported by Ariovich (1980) which repudiate the applicability of this model to South African conditions, do not constitute a satisfactory test of it. Nevertheless, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not depend on the validity of the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem. It only depends on how the marginal productivities of the factors are affected, for which incomplete specialisation and different factor intensities are the sole requirements (Chacholiades, 1978). Thus Stolper and Samuelson themselves argue that: 'It does not follow that our results stand and fall with the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem ' (1941, p. 72). As long as there is a fairly consistent relationship between factor prices and marginal products, the theorem is likely to be a good predictor of income redistribution, irrespective of whether the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem holds or not. The standard argument in favour of economic sanctions is that a weakened economy will reduce the absolute income of capital more than labour, which, given the highly unequal distribution of income, has little to lose anyway. In other words, the impact of sanctions is expected to fall most heavily on capital. This isbelieved to be desirable on the grounds that capitalists control the pace of political reform in South Africa. According to this line of reasoning, the pace of reform will be speeded up by reducing profits. But, on the basis of orthodox trade theory, it is not clear why sanctions should imply any loss of income to capital at all. Contrary to popular belief, economic theory predicts that the position of capital is likely to be strengthened, not weakened, by sanctions. If politicians are indeed manipulated by capitalists, the effect of sanctions will be to slow down, not speed up, the pace of political change, whilst making the income distribution in South Africa more unequal still.