The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents

Meernik, James; Waterman, Peter G.

doi:10.2307/449098

Cited by 83 publications

(130 citation statements)

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“…Consistent with this expectation, several studies of American foreign policy indicate that presidents have been more likely to use military force when their approval ratings have been in decline (Ostrom & Job 1986, James & Oneal 1991, Fordham 1998. Other studies have indicated-contrary to the diversionary logic-that U.S. presidents have been more likely to use military force when economic conditions have been favorable (Lian & Oneal 1993, Meernik & Waterman 1996. On the question of how public opinion influences American foreign policy, however, even these critical studies find that declining public approval has increased the probability that American presidents will use military force (Meernik 2000).…”

supporting

confidence: 48%

Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection

Aldrich

Gelpi

Feaver

et al. 2006

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

252

143

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Key Words public opinion, voting behavior, foreign policy decision making, democratic accountability ■ Abstract Public opinion is central to representation, democratic accountability, and decision making. Yet, the public was long believed to be relatively uninterested in foreign affairs, absent an immediate threat to safety and welfare. It had become conventional to say that "voting ends at water's edge." We start the examination of the scholarly understanding of the role of foreign affairs in public opinion and voting at that low point of view. Much subsequent development saw an increasing degree of holding and using of attitudes and beliefs about foreign affairs among the public. Moving in parallel with developments in political psychology, theoretical and methodological advances led to an increasingly widely shared view that the public holds reasonably sensible and nuanced views, that these help shape their political behaviors, and that these, in turn, help shape and constrain foreign policy making. "War is much too serious a matter to be entrusted to the military." -Georges Clemenceau" [Clemenceau] once said that war is too important to be left to the generals.

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supporting

confidence: 48%

Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection

Aldrich

Gelpi

Feaver

et al. 2006

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

252

143

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…At the same time, the size of rally effects in approval ratings after major foreign policy events is usually small and of limited duration (Lian and Oneal, 1993;Oneal and Bryan, 1995;Eichenberg et al, 2006). This reduces the incentives to use military force to bolster domestic political fortunes (Meernik and Waterman, 1996) and, thus, it provides a compelling reason for why we usually do not observe an increase in the opportunistic use of force abroad in election years (Ostrom and Job, 1986;James and Oneal, 1991;Gowa, 1998). 2 In this link between foreign-policy outcomes and electoral results lies a portentous challenge to the skepticism of realist scholars about democracies in the international arena.…”

Section: Elections and State External Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy

Chiozza

2016

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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This study investigates an observable implication of audience cost theory. Building upon rational expectations theories of voters' choice and foreign policy substitutability theory, it posits that audience costs vary over the electoral calendar. It then assesses whether US presidents' major responses in international crises reflect the variability in audience costs in an analysis of 66 international crises between 1937 and 2006. Using out-of-sample tests, this study finds that tying-hand commitment strategies were more frequent closer to presidential elections, as expected from audience cost theory. It also finds that the fluctuation of audience costs over the electoral calendar is non-linear.

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“…Meernik and Waterman (1996), Ostrom and Job (1986) and Wilkenfeld (1968) find that the decision to start war is determined by the nature of regime (polyarchic or authoritarian), international political issues and domestic concerns. Meernik and Waterman (1996) find little evidence that domestic conditions, trade and domestic support determine the use of force. However, Levy (1989) finds that there is no clear cut relationship that domestic factors influence foreign policy or international crises affect the choice to start a war.…”

Section: Conflict-aid Nexusmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It also decreases transnational terrorism. According to Levy (1989), Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998), Meernik and Waterman (1996), Ostrom and Job (1986), Rummel (1963) and Smith (1996), belligerent politicians use wars as a diversionary tactic to consolidate their domestic position in domestic crises. These scholars hold that unpopular democratic governments can use active foreign policy (diversionary war) to win electoral support but there is no evidence that such a policy leads to re-election or the realization of strategic objectives.…”

Section: Conflict-aid Nexusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does aid cause conflict in Pakistan?

Tahir

2015

Defence and Peace Economics

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This study provides evidence from Pakistan on how the delegated task of achieving strategic objectives of the donor can lead to incompatibility of aid objectives which then generates perpetual and multidimensional domestic conflict in the recipient society. We use count data method to estimate the relationship between aid and conflict. At the aggregate level, social sector spending, regime change and youth bulge are positively and significantly related with conflict. However, aid per capita gives ambiguous results. It is significant with conflict count in the terrorism data-set and insignificant for data on armed conflict. Inclusion of youth bulge and unemployment rate confirms the marginalization hypothesis of conflict. Inflation rate and the tax variables are insignificant. This confirms that aid erodes fiscal capacity. At project-level data, conflict is strongly related with aid commitment and purpose. Discrepancy in aid allocation and commitment may accentuate conflict.

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The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents

Cited by 83 publications

References 0 publications

Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection

Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection

Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy

Does aid cause conflict in Pakistan?

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