The Myth of the Annual Budget

Caiden, Naomi

doi:10.2307/976121

Cited by 23 publications

(26 citation statements)

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“…Congressional tradeoffs between budget authority and outlays thus have come to resemble those within the Executive as a result of the clash of budgetary and fiscal policy demands. Schick (1983) and Caiden (1982Caiden ( , 1984 cite these congressional disputes over the budgetary base and economic assumptions as evidence of a new political context for budgeting in both the Executive and Congress. While we agree with these scholars on the appearance and character of these new forms of budgetary behavior in Congress, such behavior in fact is not unprecedented within the federal budgetary process.…”

Section: Strategic Behavior In the Congressional Budgetary Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, as we discuss below, many of the "new rules" and other aspects of budgetary behavior cited by Schick (1983) and Caiden (1982Caiden ( , 1984 reflect the appearance within Congress of behavior long characteristic of the Executive branch. Such behavior typically is held in check within the Executive branch by limits on both the duration of debate and the range of issues subject to debate, as well as restrictions on access to the process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The first decade of the Congressional Budget Act: Legislative imitation and adaptation in budgeting

Kamlet

Mowery

1985

Policy Sci

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The influence of institutions on budgetary behavior at the federal level is the subject of this article, which examines the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. While its impact on budgetary priorities and growth seems modest at best, the Act has had a substantial impact on the process of budgetary decisionmaking, the nature of budgetary debate, and the budgetary strategies employed within Congress. These new and generally dysfunctional forms of congessional budgetary behavior are consequences of a budgetary reform that attempted to transfer many of the resource allocation procedures of the Executive branch to a legislative context. The transfer of many Executive branch budgetary procedures has led to the appearance within Congress of budgetary behavior previously confined largely to the Executive branch. The article also discusses attempts to render the congressional budget process more compatible with the legislative environment, analyzing the modifications in the original budget process that have been effected and proposed in recent years.

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Section: Strategic Behavior In the Congressional Budgetary Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The first decade of the Congressional Budget Act: Legislative imitation and adaptation in budgeting

Kamlet

Mowery

1985

Policy Sci

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“…Recent discussions and analyses of the present budgetary"crisis" (e.g., Caiden, 1982), no less than discussion of the presidential management "crisis" (National Academy of Public Administration, 1980) have proceeded, by and large, with weak theoretical underpinnings. Many of the budgetary trends that were discussed above have been noted in this literature; what has been lacking is any analysis of the political incentives and interactions that underpin circumventionist behavior and outcomes.…”

Section: Conclusion: Games Presidents Do Not Playmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 These deficiencies are suggested in statistical analyses (see Fischer and Kamlet, 1983;Kamlet and Mowery, 1983b) and discussed extensively in Caiden (1982), Fisher (1982), and Aaron (1983) Kamlet and Mowery (1983b). 4 Indeed, most formal models of government growth (e.g., Niskanen) do not allow at all for the existence of a strong executive branch politician, analyzing instead the interaction of legislative politician and agency bureaucrats.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Games presidents do and do not play: Presidential circumvention of the executive branch budget process

Mowery

Kamlet

1984

Policy Sci

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The federal executive budgetary process has been severely criticized in recent years for its apparent inability to curb budgetary growth and limit deficits. Much of this criticism ignores the essentially political, rather than administrative, causes of these trends. Budgetary growth and deficit spending may be viewed in part as the results of presidential circumvention of budgetary and fiscal policy processes. Circumvention consists of the movement of spending decisions out of the annual review and evaluation of current-year budgetary formulation, thus evading the constraints frequently imposed by budgetary and fiscal policies. The precise mechanisms of presidential circumvention have changed over time. However, the long-term impact of circumvention has been a reduction in the controllability and comprehensiveness of the annual federal budget, as well as higher rates of budgetary growth.

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“…The carry-over issue deals with reducing the rigidity of the annual budget, where the year's revenues should strictly support the expenses of the same fiscal year (Caiden, 1982). The complete rigidity in the association of expenses and revenues in the year has side effects.…”

Section: Literature On Budget Carry-overmentioning

confidence: 99%

Restos a pagar e a perda da credibilidade orçamentária

Aquino

Azevedo

2017

Rev. Adm. Pública

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This article discusses the use of unpaid commitments and its impacts on the credibility and transparency of public finances. Based on a typification of the four types of existing carry-over in current Brazilian regulation, the article shows evidence of the emergence of a "parallel budget" in the three levels of government with regulation and external control issues. The development of the balances and enrollment of the unpaid commitments was proxied by the sum of these accounts in the Federal Government balance sheet, as well as in 26 States and the Federal District, and for 4,100 cities. Additionally, the interpretation given by the Courts of Auditors for unpaid commitments usage by governments without financial ballast was observed as well as the level of transparency given by those governments with the larger amounts of unpaid commitments. The results indicate that, besides the growing debt, the weak regulation of unverified unpaid commitments is seriously reducing the credibility and transparency of the budget at all levels of government. Keywords: unpaid commitments; public budget; carry-over; indebtedness; transparency. Restos a pagar e a perda da credibilidade orçamentáriaO artigo discute o uso da inscrição em restos a pagar e seus impactos na credibilidade e na transparência do orçamento público. A partir de uma tipificação dos quatro tipos de carry-over existentes na regulação brasileira, articularam-se evidências do surgimento de um "orçamento paralelo" nos três níveis de governo com aspectos de regulamentação e controle externo. A evolução dos saldos e da inscrição de restos a pagar foi captada pelos saldos dessas contas no governo federal, nos governos de 26 estados e Distrito Federal, e em cerca de 4.100 municípios. Adicionalmente, observaram-se a interpretação dada pelos Tribunais de Contas para a inscrição em restos a pagar sem lastro financeiro, assim como o nível de transparência dada pelos governos com maiores saldos de restos a pagar. Os resultados indicam que, além do crescente endividamento, a fraca regulação sobretudo dos restos a pagar não processados está reduzindo seriamente a credibilidade e a transparência do orçamento em todos níveis de governo. Palavras-chave: restos a pagar; orçamento público; carry-over; endividamento, transparência. Compromisos pendientes y la credibilidad del presupuesto públicoEl artículo debate el uso de la inscripción en restante a pagar y sus impactos en la credibilidad y en la transparencia del presupuesto público. A partir de una tipificación de los cuatro tipos de carry-over existentes en la reglamentación brasileña, se articularon evidencias del surgimiento de un "presupuesto paralelo" en los tres niveles del gobierno con aspectos de reglamentación y control externo. La evolución de los saldos y de la inscripción en restante a pagar fue captada de los saldos de tales cuentas en el gobierno federal, en los gobiernos de 26 estados y el Distrito Federal, y cerca de 4.100 municipios. Además, se observó la interpretación dada por los Tribunales de Cuentas para...

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The Myth of the Annual Budget

Cited by 23 publications

References 2 publications

The first decade of the Congressional Budget Act: Legislative imitation and adaptation in budgeting

The first decade of the Congressional Budget Act: Legislative imitation and adaptation in budgeting

Games presidents do and do not play: Presidential circumvention of the executive branch budget process

Restos a pagar e a perda da credibilidade orçamentária

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