The moving spotlight(s)

Spolaore, Giuseppe; Torrengo, Giuliano

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1610046

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Much recent literature about MST has focused on whether it really provides a sense of temporal passage (see Cameron, 2015; Deasy, 2018; Fine, 2005, pp. 286–287; Sider, 2017; Skow, 2017; Spolaore & Torrengo, 2021). However, the paper is particularly interested in a relatively less discussed issue: what does a present thing do?…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal theories of the moving spotlight

Jhou

2023

Ratio

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The moving spotlight theory of time (MST) is the thesis that past, present, and future things equally exist, but present things are fundamentally special, and what is present keeps changing. Present things are like being shined by a spotlight, and the spotlight keeps moving. There are various ways of spelling out what it is to be present and what makes present things so special. For example, for a thing to be present is to have an age (Cameron's MST), to have multiple temporary fundamental properties (Williamsonian MST), or to be part of what super-is the case (Skow's MST-supertense), etc.

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Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal theories of the moving spotlight

Jhou

2023

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“…11-12). Those arguments have been debunked in many ways, for instance by Paul (2010), Skow (2011), Frischhut (2015), Deng (2017), Spolaore andTorrengo (2019), andFarr (2020). For a recent defence of the idea that experience favours metaphysical realism, see Baron (2017).…”

Section: Realism and Pheno -Flow Primitivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flow and presentness in experience

Torrengo

Cassaghi

2022

Philosophical Books

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In the contemporary landscape about temporal experience, debates concerning the "hard question" of the experience of the flow-as opposed to debates concerning more qualitative aspects of temporality, such as change, movement, succession and duration-are gaining more and more attention. The overall dialectics can be thought of in terms of a debate between the realists (who take the phenomenology of the flow of time seriously, and propose various account of it) and deflationists (who take our description of temporal phenomenology as "flowy" to be spurious, and propose various explanation of this spuriousness). In this paper we look inside the realist side. We distinguish primitivist realism, according to which the feeling of time flowing is an irreducible sui generis phenomenology, and various forms of reductionist realism, according to which the experience of the flow is ultimately explainable in terms of a more basic phenomenology. We present reasons to be sceptical against the various reductionist proposals.The conclusion is thus disjunctive: either primitivism or deflationism is the correct account of the purported experience of the flow of time.

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“…As an anonymous referee pointed out to me, some philosophers have argued that Priorian views fail to secure 'dynamic' change: see e.g Deng (2013)Fine (2005);Leininger (2015);Lipman (2018); andSkow (2015). Unfortunately, limitations of space mean that it is not possible to consider these arguments here.6 Read '< >' as 'the proposition that '.…”

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confidence: 99%

A (limited) defence of Priorianism

Deasy

2020

Inquiry

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This paper defends Priorianism, a theory in the philosophy of time which combines three theses: first, that there is a metaphysical distinction between the present time and non-present times; second, that there are temporary propositions, that is, propositions that change in truthvalue simpliciter over time; and third, that there is change over time only if there are temporary propositions. Priorianism is accepted by many Presentists, Growing Block Theorists, and Moving Spotlight Theorists. However, it is difficult to defend the view without appealing to premises that those who reject the view find controversial. My aim in this paper is to defend Priorianism in a way that largely avoids appealing to such premises. I do three things: first (Section 1), I describe the component theses of Priorianism and the relations between them. Next (Section 2), I show how Priorians can respond to the argument that the B-theory implies that there are temporary propositions, and therefore satisfies the Priorian condition for there being change over time. Finally (Section 3), I defend the Priorian thesis that there is change over time only if there are temporary propositions against an alternative principle of change defended by Ross Cameron (The Moving Spotlight, 2015).

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The moving spotlight(s)

Cited by 5 publications

References 20 publications

Causal theories of the moving spotlight

Causal theories of the moving spotlight

Flow and presentness in experience

A (limited) defence of Priorianism

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