The more the merrier? Assessing the impact of enlargement on EU performance in energy and climate change policies

Abstract

This article examines the impact of enlargement on European Union (EU) performance in energy and climate change policies. It looks at process-driven performance, focusing especially on agenda-setting, negotiation dynamics and institutional changeas well outcome-driven performance, looking at policy objectives and their implementation. The empirical analysis is based on qualitative, comparative case studies of EU climate change and energy security policies. We argue that, although recent enlargements have not led to permanent institutional deadlock or a stable Eastern coalition, they have contributed to bringing some issues back to the top of the European agendasuch as the security of gas suppliesas well as to fuel old debatesin particular the issue of burden sharing in climate change negotiations. In terms of outcome, enlargement has not prevented the adoption of relatively ambitious climate legislation, although Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) have been able to obtain significant concessions. Besides, CEECs have made a positive, although limited, contribution to improving EU security. However, their impact may further increase as the paper points to their renewed assertiveness in both energy security and climate policy in recent years.

The European Union’s international climate leadership: towards a grand climate strategy?

“…Although the targets have not necessarily fully reflected advancing scientific knowledge, they have consistently been the most ambitious among the major economies and have increasingly aligned towards mid-century climate neutrality (Torney & O'Gorman, 2020;von Homeyer et al, 2021). The progress in climate policy occurred in a turbulent internal context that featured the emergence of a strong East-West cleavage around 2010 (Bocquillon & Maltby, 2017;Skovgaard, 2014) as well as rising populism and Euroscepticism (Huber et al, 2021), and was balanced with public support and societal mobilization for action on climate change (see also Buzogány & Ćetković, 2021;Petri & Biedenkopf, 2021).…”

EU climate and energy governance in times of crisis: towards a new agenda

“…The existing literature suggests that the rise of Eurosceptic, nationalist and populist parties/factions and regional divisions has affected climate policy. For example, East-West divisions featured prominently in several political conflicts over EU climate policy after 2000 (e.g., Bocquillon & Maltby, 2017). Furthermore, nationalist and right-wing populist parties have also tended to be climate-sceptic (e.g., Lockwood, 2018;Schaller & Carius, 2019), even though (our understanding of) the way in which the identity cleavage intersects with climate governance is still evolving (Huber et al, 2021;Jahn, 2021;Weko, 2021).…”

Rising Subnational Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Challenge to Meeting Federal Climate Policy

“…In contrast with Spain, Poland, heavily reliant on coal, has perhaps been the Member State most critical and pro-active in weakening EU climate policies. Poland led an opposition group to weaken climate policies such as the Energy and Climate Package adopted in 2008 (Szczerbiak 2012) and the 2030 climate package adopted in 2014 (Bocquillon and Maltby 2017). Each time the EU was able to secure Poland and other opposing Member States' support by making "significant concessions and financial compensation measures" (Carey 2015, 11; see also Bocquillon and Maltby 2017).…”

“…Poland led an opposition group to weaken climate policies such as the Energy and Climate Package adopted in 2008 (Szczerbiak 2012) and the 2030 climate package adopted in 2014 (Bocquillon and Maltby 2017). Each time the EU was able to secure Poland and other opposing Member States' support by making "significant concessions and financial compensation measures" (Carey 2015, 11; see also Bocquillon and Maltby 2017). The EU took Poland to the European Court of Justice in March 2013 over its failure to implement the renewable energy directive, requiring it to achieve 15 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2020; Poland eventually implemented the directive in 2015, five years behind deadline (Skjaerseth 2018).…”