The Morality of Lying in St. Augustine

Pacifism is routinely criticized as sectarian, incoherent, and preoccupied with moral purity at the expense of responsibility. The author contends that the pacifism of John Howard Yoder is vulnerable to none of these charges and defends this claim by establishing parallels between Yoder's analysis of killing and Augustine's analysis of lying. Although, within the terms of his own argument, Augustine's rejection of all lying as unjust is consistent with his condoning of some killing as just, the author shows that given a different conception of the defining characteristic of God (noncoercive love instead of truth), Augustine's theological argument against lying would become an argument against violence. The author therefore suggests that Yoder's rejection of killing is no more sectarian, incoherent, or irresponsible that Augustine's rejection of lying.

Section: Defining the Liementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For an admirable catalogue of the multiple theological and philosophical arguments Augustine develops against lying, seeFeehan 1988Feehan , 1990Feehan , 1991. Feehan does not, however, provide an adequate treatment of the fundamentally theological character of Augustine's rejection of lies.…”

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confidence: 99%

Unjust Lies, Just Wars? A Christian Pacifist Conversation with Augustine

Weaver¹

2001

“… See, for example, Brinton ; Ramsey ; Feehan ; Fleming ; Dodaro ; Newey ; Griffiths ; von Heyking ; Weaver ; Davis ; Johnson ; Levenick ; Decosimo ; Gramigna ; Tollefsen . Among Augustine's most careful interpreters on the topic of lying, Griffiths addresses each of these standard elements (see Griffiths , 25–39).…”

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confidence: 99%

Retracing Augustine's Ethics

Puffer¹

2016

Augustine's exposition of the image of God in Book 15 of On The Trinity (De Trinitate) sheds light on multiple issues that arise in scholarly interpretations of Augustine's account of lying. This essay argues against interpretations that posit a uniform account of lying in Augustine—with the same constitutive features, and insisting both that it is never necessary to tell a lie and that lying is absolutely prohibited. Such interpretations regularly employ intertextual reading strategies that elide distinctions and developments in Augustine's ethics of lying. Instead, I show how looking at texts written prior and subsequent to the texts usually consulted suggests a trajectory in Augustine's thought, beginning with an understanding of lies as morally culpable but potentially necessary, and culminating in a vision of lying as the fundamental evil and the origin of every sin.

“…I have benefited from and checked my translation against other available translations. Literature on Augustine's treatment of lying is expansive, but among the best are three articles in which Thomas Feehan carefully analyzes DM and CM regarding, respectively, the definition of the lie, the character of the prohibition, and the details and significance of Augustine's examples of lying (Feehan 1988, 1990, 1991). Griffiths 1999, 3–13 is also admirably clear.…”

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confidence: 99%

JUST LIES: Finding Augustine's Ethics of Public Lying in His Treatments of Lying and Killing

Decosimo¹

2010

Augustine famously defends the justice of killing in certain public contexts such as just wars. He also claims that private citizens who intentionally kill are guilty of murder, regardless of their reasons. Just as famously, Augustine seems to prohibit lying categorically. Analyzing these features of his thought and their connections, I argue that Augustine is best understood as endorsing the justice of lying in certain public contexts, even though he does not explicitly do so. Specifically, I show that parallels between his treatments of killing and lying along with his "agent (auctor)-instrument (minister)" distinction, in which God is the true agent or "author" of certain acts and humans are merely God's instruments, together imply that he would regard certain instances of public lying as permissible and even obligatory. I buttress my argument by examining several key but neglected passages and by responding to various objections and rival interpretations. Throughout, I challenge standard interpretations of Augustine's ethics of killing and lying and seek to deepen our overall understanding of these dimensions of his thought. In so doing, I contribute to ongoing discussions of public and private lying and to the task of relating Augustine's thought to contemporary debate and deliberation on war, killing, and lying.