The Moral Status of Beings who are not Persons: A Casuistic Argument

Abstract

This paper addresses the question: Who or what can have a moral status in the sense that we have direct moral duties to them? It argues for a biocentric answer which ascribes inherent moral status value to all individual living organisms. This position must be defended against an anthropocentric position. The argument from marginal cases propounded by Tom Regan and Peter Singer for this purpose is criticised as defective, and a different argument is proposed. The biocentric position developed here is related to that of Albert Schweitzer and Paul F. Taylor, but rejects their assumption of equal inherent value for all living organisms. It argues instead for equal moral status value for moral persons and agents, and gradual moral status value for nonpersons, depending on their degree of similarity with moral persons. Mary Ann Warren's recent book on Moral Status is also discussed. The argument is constructed as a casuistic argument, proceeding by analogical extension from persons to nonpersons. The meta-ethical question of its pragmatic validity is discussed.

Reconsidering Approaches to Moral Status

“…Some well-known uni-criterial approaches also assume that there is one and only one property that is sufficient for having full and equal moral status (see, Kant, Singer and Schweitzer). Multi-criterial standard approaches assume that there are several-or a plurality of-valid criteria of moral status-that is, a plurality of properties that are morally relevant for ascribing moral status to different beings (see Warren, 1997;Wetlesen, 1999). Jon Wetlesen has developed an interesting multi-criterial approach that combines different relevant properties in a way that provide a basis for graded moral statusthat is, some beings have a higher moral status than other beings based on their internal properties.…”

How shall i compare thee? Comparing the prudential value of actual virtual friendship

“…Gosepath (2008)]. See also Søraker (2007) and Wetlesen (1999). matter of well-being is far too contingent upon individual life conditions for that to be possible-but my hope is that these considerations will be of use when we try to clarify the role we want virtual friends to have in our lives, and in the lives of those we care for.…”

Dignity in the West

“…Furthermore, Kantians have considered possible ways out of this dilemma. The most radical move is to argue that species rationality (Wetlesen 1999) (zôon logon, animale rationale) confers dignity, independent of the reasoning faculties of individual human beings. The argument would then be that the human species is a species of rational beings and that all those who belong to the species should enjoy the benefits that are obtained through common species features.…”