The moral residue of conservation

Abstract

Should conservationists use lethal management to control introduced wildlife populations? Should they kill individual animals to protect endangered species? Are trade-offs that prioritize some values at the expense of others morally appropriate? These sorts of ethical questions are common in conservation. In debating such questions, conservationists often seem to presume 1 of 2 possible answers: the act in question is right or it is wrong. But morality in conservation is considerably more complex than this simple binary suggests. A robust conservation ethic requires a vocabulary that gives voice to the uncertainty and unease that arise when what seems to be the best available course of action also seems to involve a measure of wrongdoing. The philosophical literature on moral residue and moral dilemmas supplies this vocabulary. Moral dilemmas arise when one must neglect certain moral requirements to fulfill others. Under such circumstances, even the best possible decision leaves a moral residue, which is experienced emotionally as some form of grief. Examples of conservation scenarios that leave a moral residue include management of introduced rabbits in Australia, trophy hunting in Africa, and forest management trade-offs in the Pacific Northwest. Moral residue is integral to the moral experience of conservationists today, and grief is an appropriate response to many decisions conservationists must make.

Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation

“…Under such tragic circumstances, it is not clear that any decision can be made with moral impunity (Batavia et al. 2020). Our most quotidian moments harm sentient beings, and choices must be made that inevitably prioritize some over others.…”

“…Certainly, in some situations, it can be challenging to find ideal solutions. Even in the strictly human domain, it can be difficult or impossible to fulfill all moral obligations (Batavia et al 2020). However, the conclusion that conservationists should simply renounce compassion for nonhuman animals in cases of conflict is inconsistent with the understanding of compassion as a virtue.…”

Reconsidering humaneness

“…As such, these terms could be argued to represent a false dichotomy, and we suggest they lack the precision suitable for evidence-based wildlife management (see Vantassel 2012). The limitations of binary vocabularies for com-plex issues have been articulated for other terms used in conservation, such as morality (Batavia et al 2020). We note attempts to categorize practices as more or less humane (e.g., Littin et al 2004) but contend that the language remains imprecise.…”

“…The limitations of binary vocabularies for complex issues have been articulated for other terms used in conservation, such as morality (Batavia et al. 2020). We note attempts to categorize practices as more or less humane (e.g., Littin et al.…”

What is valued in conservation? A framework to compare ethical perspectives

“…In practice, Equation 5 may be combined with a perspective considering the morality of culling sentient species ( M ≤ 1), by discussing if one may consider a threshold in total suffering (quantified by C ) over which culling is acceptable or not (an issue related to the concept of “moral residue”; Batavia et al 2020). This threshold is likely to vary with each person, and we will focus on the consequentialist perspective in the following.…”