The moral emotions: A social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt.

Abstract

Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whether distinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differences among anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), others have suggested that these terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior (Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a social-functionalist perspective, which makes the prediction that these emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions and judgments. Studies 1-3 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions among antecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously been described, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt in judging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictions concerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with different consequences. Taken together, these studies support a social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions.

Moral emotions and the envisaging of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing

“…Many studies have connected disgust to moral judgment (e.g., Inbar et al, 2009;Rozin et al, 1999;Schnall et al, 2008;Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Still, the relationship between disgust and moral judgment is far from clear (see Haidt, 2001;Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2008;Hutcherson & Gross, 2011;Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011;Prinz, 2007;Russell et al, 2012). As we have seen in the present research, anger seems to be more tightly connected to moral judgment, and the factors affecting moral judgment, than is disgust.…”

“…This research has started to document important differences between the emotions of anger and disgust-two distinct emotions that have both been implicated in judgments of wrongdoing (e.g., see Haidt et al, 1993;Hutcherson & Gross, 2011;Rozin et al, 1999).…”

Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks

“…Compared with nonmoral emotions, moral emotions are those that are most often associated with evaluations of societal norms (11) and are elicited by interests that may go beyond self-interest [e.g., contempt in response to injustices committed in another country (12)]. Importantly, moral emotions may also be tied specifically to behavior that is relevant to morality and politics, including judgments of responsibility and voting (13,14). Thus, emotions can be roughly divided into classes of "moral emotions" and "nonmoral emotions" that are associated with distinct appraisals, eliciting conditions, and functional outcomes.…”

Weight bias: Investigating the impact of an empathy-evoking intervention in reducing mental health professionals' anti-fat attitudes

“…Of the three emotions only disgust was a significant positive predictor of obesity stereotypes, and therefore shown to play an important role in negative attitudes toward people who are obese. Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt (1999) indicate that disgust is a 'moral emotion', which is related to prejudice toward various social groups that are uniquely associated with violations of social norms or moral standards (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). In fact, a study by Krendl et al (2006) found activation in brain regions associated with disgust when participants viewed images of individuals who are obese.…”