1969
DOI: 10.2307/3500200
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The Modern Corporation and Private Property

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Agency theory significantly influences corporate governance (Linder and Foss, 2013). Babeau (1969) drove corporate governance, concentrating on the separate ownership of companies that controls the problem of principal and agent. They recognized corporate governance as an instrument by which the board of directors will play the part of a monitoring device to lessen the problems conveyed by the principal-agent relationship (Atosh and Iraya, 2018).…”
Section: Agency Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Agency theory significantly influences corporate governance (Linder and Foss, 2013). Babeau (1969) drove corporate governance, concentrating on the separate ownership of companies that controls the problem of principal and agent. They recognized corporate governance as an instrument by which the board of directors will play the part of a monitoring device to lessen the problems conveyed by the principal-agent relationship (Atosh and Iraya, 2018).…”
Section: Agency Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Control right refers to the right to arrange and dispose of a certain resource, which reflects the indirect or direct influence of decision-makers on enterprise decision-making. In a company, the rights of managers are defined and restricted according to laws and contracts and also depend on the use and distribution of financial and human resources of the company [6,10]. Due to the superior-subordinate relationship, status difference, and resource allocation difference in the enterprise, large shareholders or dominant subjects usually use different resources to seek their interests, thus forming additional control rights and benefits [11].…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…ese resources reflect the government's ability to dispose of resources. Due to the administrative characteristics of the government, in practice, there is some subjective advantage information that usually can only be judged according to the cooperation experience of investors, such as status and regulatory information [5,6]. Subjective information expands the perception bias of different investors to the government control rights, resulting in unequal control rights and contradictory decision-making, which is not conducive to the sustainability of cooperation between the government and investors [7].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%