The Moderating Role of Category Salience and Category Focus in Judgments of Set Size and Frequency of Occurrence

Abstract

Recent work on frequency estimation has provided evidence that availability, as measured by recall, determines judgments of set size but not of frequency of occurrence. The latter in turn rather reflect actual presentation frequencies. In contrast, the present series of experiments shows that by controlling category focus during encoding and category salience during recall, a dramatically altered pattern of effects is obtained. Adopting the research methodology of Manis, Shedler, Jonides, and Nelson (1993), the authors demonstrate that recall does influence frequency of occurrence judgments if the superordinate category is brought into focus during encoding. Furthermore, set size judgments reflect actual presentation frequencies and are almost uninfluenced by recall if the superordinate category is not salient during recall.

Likelihood judgment based on previously observed outcomes: the alternative-outcomes effect in a learning paradigm

“…Regarding the first type of account, there is a broad range of theories about how people track and judge the frequency of objects, words, events, and other entities (e.g., Betsch, Siebler, Marz, Hormuth, & Dickenberger, 1999;Brown, 1995Brown, , 1997Greene, 1986Greene, , 1989Hasher & Zacks, 1984;Hintzman, 1988Hintzman, , 2001Howell, 1973;Jonides & NavehBenjamin, 1987;Maki & Ostby, 1987;Manis, Shedler, Jonides, & Nelson, 1993;Sedlmeier et al, 1998). Although these theories can account for a variety of frequency judgment effects, including some context effects, they do not provide specific predictions about how the judged frequency of a particular object would be influenced by the distribution of frequencies across individualobjects in the same context or category.…”

Judgments of Risk Frequencies: Tests of Possible Cognitive Mechanisms.

“…We take these findings to suggest that people have a toolbox of different strategies and, in addition, that they can switch back and forth between different kinds of information (Betsch, Siebler, Marz, Hormuth, & Dickenberger, 1999;Brown, 2002a;Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Thus, the same person is not likely to use the same mechanism for each single inference.…”

The effect of category focus at encoding on category frequency estimation strategies

“…Still, people can use stored frequency information only if they have classified the instance into relevant categories. Whether they use availability despite the presence of stored category frequency information may depend on situation features, such as having engaged in recall prior to the estimation task (see, e.g., Betsch et al, 1999;Bruce et al, 1991) or being instructed to think carefully (e.g., Haberstroh & Betsch, 2002 911). In addition, people who have access to stored frequency information may base their estimates on that information but may supplement it with availability information.…”

“…If someone wonders how many mammals he or she has seen in a certain zoo, he or she basically estimates the frequency of the category mammals and, more specifically, mammals in zoo X. Category frequencies differ from event frequencies in that the latter refer to the number of times a stimulus has occurred (e.g., Betsch, Siebler, Marz, Hormuth, & Dickenberger, 1999;Hanson & Hirst, 1988;Manis, Shedler, Jonides, & Nelson, 1993). When estimating the number of parking tickets one has had, one is estimating an event frequency.…”

“…Manis et al (1993) even argued that it is the best operationalization. Therefore, estimating category frequencies through availability is supposed to create a strong correlation between the estimates and the number of instances recalled (e.g., Betsch et al, 1999;Bruce, Hockley, & Craik, 1991;Manis et al, 1993;Watkins & LeCompte, 1991). Moreover, the correlation should reflect a direct, rather than an indirect, relationship (e.g., Betsch et al, 1999;Bruce et al, 1991;Maley, Hunt, & Parr, 2000;Manis et al, 1993).…”