The mobilisation of identities: a study on the relationship between elite rhetoric and public opinion on national identity in developed democracies

Abstract

Over the last decade, the topic of national‐identity has gained considerable importance after various heads of states have made it an important political issue in the context of ongoing globalisation and European integration processes. There is also a large, mainly historical literature that has emphasised the role of the political elite in the formation of national‐identities. While this argument is widely discussed in both public and academic debates, there is, surprisingly, hardly any empirical research on this issue. We do not know whether elite positions resonate with how the masses think about these issues. We therefore set out to test this relationship by combining the 2003 wave of the International Social Survey Programme and content analysis of elite mobilisation rhetoric from the Comparative Manifesto Project. Results indicate that an overlap exists between politicians' articulation of exclusive notions about the contours of national‐identity and heightened expressions of civic and ethnic national‐identity within public opinion. By contrast, elite mobilisation along more inclusive lines appears ineffective. From this, it appears that exclusionary arguments play a more important role, at least in terms of attitudes about national‐identity, than inclusionary ones.

Repertoires of national boundaries in France and Germany—within‐country cleavages and their political consequences

“…This implies not only more detailed analyses of the symbolic boundaries surrounding the nation and their country‐specific contexts, but also focusing on the processes‐related and interactive character of boundary‐making between different groups and between elites and ordinary people (e.g. Piwoni ; Helbling, Reeskens and Wright ).…”

The Political Sources of Social Solidarity

“…Iversen and Soskice (2012) find, for instance, that among people with similar incomes trade union members are more likely than non-members to favor redistribution (see also Kumlin and Svallfors 2007). Helbling, Reeskens, and Wright (2013) note that, when partly platforms make more nationalist appeals, whether of a civic or ethnic nature, popular hostility to immigrants also increases (see also Cavaillé 2014). Thus, redistributive solidarity may be harder to sustain after three decades marked by the ascendance of a neoliberal rhetoric.…”

“…In many countries, their electoral base is being sapped by rising parties of the radical right. Although radical right parties have recently become more supportive of redistribution for native-born citizens, they are determined opponents of redistribution to immigrants; and their prominence raises the electoral salience of a narrow nationalism inimical to the extension of redistributive solidarity (Norris 2005;Shayo 2009;Helbling, Reeskens, and Wright 2013). As a result, even mainstream parties are hedging on the question of promoting rights for immigrants and ethnic minorities.…”

“…Once again, the evidence is not dispositive partly because the available measures are so limited, but we can form a preliminary assessment by comparing the character of each country's national identity with support for redistribution there. To assess a country's national identity, I use the average national score on indices for civic and ethnic nationalism derived from a factor analysis by Helbling, Reeskens, and Wright (2013) of respondents to a 2003 ISSP survey.…”

“…In short, some minimal national identity may be a necessary prerequisite for redistribution, but stronger civic or ethnic identities do not seem to increase support for it. Helbling, Reeskens, and Wright (2013 …”