The Missiles of November, December, January, February…: The Problem of Acceptable Risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis Settlement

Coleman, David

doi:10.1162/jcws.2007.9.3.5

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…131 It has been suggested that US intelligence failed to recognise the battlefield nuclear missiles, though David Coleman has argued that American military and political leaders were aware of them after one was photographed on 25 October by a USN F8U Crusader on a low-level photo-reconnaissance mission. 132 The Luna was dualcapable, and the President was briefed the following day.…”

Section: Unknown Unknowns?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Eyeball to Eyeball: Blinking and Winking, Spyplanes and Secrets

Scott¹

2012

International Relations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The role of American intelligence in the Cuban missile crisis is crucial to understanding perceptions and judgements of key actors in October 1962. Dino Brugioni?s Eyeball to Eyeball provides a detailed ?insider?s? account that combines memoir and history. It focuses on the role of aerial intelligence which was vital to how the crisis was managed in Washington. Brugioni?s account also provides a representation of events that explores both military/operational aspects and political decision-making in Washington most importantly that of President John F. Kennedy. Brugioni argues that was a victory for Kennedy and for America. Twenty years of scholarship and revelation have challenged this conclusion, a conclusion which this article examines. Likewise the idea that the crisis marked a notable success for the CIA is revisited in the light of new information and assessments.Peer reviewe

show abstract

Section: Unknown Unknowns?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Eyeball to Eyeball: Blinking and Winking, Spyplanes and Secrets

Scott¹

2012

International Relations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Coleman argues that the President not only knew of their capabilities but factored them into his calculations and was in consequence deterred from invasion. McNamara, on the other hand, expressed surprise at the 1992 revelations. Subsequently, details also emerged about eighty Meteor FKR‐1 cruise missiles.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The ‘Incredible Wrongness’ of NikitaKhrushchev: TheCIAand theCuban Missile Crisis

Scott¹

2015

History

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The role of the CIA in the Cuban Missile Crisis was of crucial importance to events and decisions. This article explores and evaluates the activities of the CIA in the crisis. It examines how intelligence‐gathering and analysis were conducted and how assessments and information were provided to decision‐makers. The study of the crisis illuminates many aspects of intelligence. On some of these there remain debates. The significance of CIA covert action against Cuba prior to October 1962, for example, is explored. Another important focus is the mistaken assessment of the US intelligence community that the Soviets were not going to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. The nature and significance of this conclusion is considered, along with the views of the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone, who contrary to his analysts, believed Khrushchev would deploy nuclear missiles. The view that the CIA played a successful part in monitoring the Soviet military build‐up after the discovery of medium‐range ballistic missiles is analysed. The lack of success in identifying Soviet tactical nuclear weapons is also considered. The article draws upon an extensive corpus of scholarship on the crisis, as well as declassified material and reflections of former officials. Research into the crisis extends to Soviet and other decision‐makers and thus helps facilitate a more genuinely international intelligence history of the Cold War. The article proffers a reflective and nuanced assessment that underlines the achievements as well as the shortcomings of the CIA at this most crucial moment in the Cold War.

show abstract

Der Ukraine-Krieg aus konfliktwissenschaftlicher Perspektive

Brose

2022

Z Außen Sicherheitspolit

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Missiles of November, December, January, February…: The Problem of Acceptable Risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis Settlement

Cited by 4 publications

References 13 publications

Eyeball to Eyeball: Blinking and Winking, Spyplanes and Secrets

Eyeball to Eyeball: Blinking and Winking, Spyplanes and Secrets

The ‘Incredible Wrongness’ of NikitaKhrushchev: TheCIAand theCuban Missile Crisis

Der Ukraine-Krieg aus konfliktwissenschaftlicher Perspektive

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About