The Military Origins of Medieval Representation

The Birth of Representative Institutions: The Case of the Crown of Aragon

“…With respect to the early phase of assemblies, the standard explanations posited in the literature, war, and taxation, thus turn out to have been of negligible importance (Finer 1997; Hintze 1975 [1931]; Maddicott 2010; Poggi 1978; Schumpeter 1991 [1917/1918]; Tilly 1990). More particularly, the analysis lends little support to Bisson's (1966) seminal argument that the early assemblies (preparliaments) that provided the harbinger for representative institutions were originally military in nature. This assertion comes with a caveat.…”

“…Most importantly, it makes it easier to capture general patterns and—related to this—to avoid overemphasizing exceptions. To illustrate, Kagay (1981: 41, 87, 115, 361–62) repeatedly argues that his descriptions corroborate Bisson's (1966) classical claim that the assemblies that became representative were originally military in nature. When interrogating the data set, however, it is obvious that Kagay does so on the basis of the kind of confirmation bias according to which, each time this was the case, it is emphasized without considering the low frequency of especially preparliaments convoked for military purposes.…”

“…These include the character of local government at the outset of medieval state building, geographical size, the military functions of nobles, the communal revolution, and the split between religious and secular power (Abramson and Boix 2014; Blaydes and Chaney 2013; Ertman 1997; Hintze 1975 [1931]; Møller 2014; Poggi 1978; Stasavage 2010, 2016; Van Zanden et al 2012). The theorizing of these factors has usually been couched in the more general insight that—in the context of intensified geopolitical competition—monarchs summoned representative institutions to make key elite groups consent to warfare and taxation (Bisson 1966; Finer 1997; Hintze 1975 [1931]; Poggi 1978; Schumpeter 1991 [1917/1918]; Tilly 1990). However, this “geopolitical” or “fiscal” line of inquiry likewise mainly focuses on the social groups that have been seen to use these institutions to rein in monarchs as a quid pro quo for assenting to taxation.…”

“…This will allow us to understand why monarchs first chose to call assemblies and how and why these assemblies later came to constrain monarchs. It will allow us to understand the more general process in which the initiative behind the summoning of representative institutions slipped from the monarch to the elite groups as political counsel came “to be recognized as a right as well as an obligation by the people summoned to give it” (Bisson 1966: 1206).…”

Polycentric Sovereignty: The Medieval Constitution, Governance Quality, and the Wealth of Nations

“…These assemblies had roots in Germanic tribal customs of the barbarian groups that succeeded the Western Roman Empire (Downing, ; Barnwell and Mostert, ; van Zanden, Buringh, and Bosker, ). See Bisson () for a discussion of the roots of medieval assemblies in the military obligations that later characterized feudal obligations.…”