The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations

Abstract

This chapter defends the view that general moral principles play an ineliminable role in moral explanations. More specifically, it argues that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. The chapter considers two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles: (i) “the nomic view,” on which moral principles are laws of metaphysics of the same broad kind as the laws that (plausibly) figure in metaphysical explanations more generally; and (ii) “moral platonism,” on which moral principles are facts about kind-applying (as opposed to particular-applying) moral properties. Along the way, the chapter criticizes the competing view that moral principles are not explanatory in the way just suggested. The chapter also considers a number of related issues, such as the distinction between metaphysical grounding and metaphysical analysis. It concludes by discussing the sense in which moral principles obtain of necessity.

No normative free lunch: relevance and the autonomy of the normative domain

“…52 See (Rosen 2017). For critical discussion and reply see (Berker 2019) and (Fogal and Risberg 2020). 53 See (Bader 2017).…”

Explaining normative reasons

“…25 This picture is not meant to be exhaustive; among other things, it ignores the fact that general normative principles (or 'laws') concerning support may (and we ourselves think do) also play a role in fully explaining particular facts about support, similar to how causal laws arguably play a role in fully explaining the occurrence of particular events (see §4.1.1). For articulation and defense of the general principle-based account of normative explanation, see Fogal and Risberg (2020). 26 We're here drawing and expanding on Berker (2007: 116), who presents a three-level model for moral explanations (rather than for normative explanations more generally).…”

“…This paragraph is indebted toFogal and Risberg (2020). For more on the metaphysics of normative explanations, seeRosen (2017) andBerker (2018).…”

“…We disagree. Instead, we think non-naturalism is best understood as the view that one or both of the following are true: (i) that fundamental normative principles cannot be explained by natural facts (cf Fogal and Risberg, 2020),. and (ii) that what it is to be right, wrong, normatively supported, or to have any other normative property cannot be explained in fully naturalistic terms (cf.…”

Normative explanation unchained

“…And what might their explanations look like, in case they have any? (Some relevant discussions of the explanatory role of moral principles include Dancy, 2004, Chapter 3;Rosen, 2017;Enoch, 2019;Berker, 2019;Fogal & Risberg, 2020;and Baker, 2021. On enablers in explanation, see, e.g., Dancy, 2004, pp.…”