The Metaphysics of Forces

Massin, Olivier

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01213.x

Cited by 23 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Antirealism about forces used to be a fairly standard view, firmly grounded in both the Cartesian and Humean traditions (there were, however, important exceptions: Bolzano, 1972;Boscovich, 1966;Euler, 1752;Kant, 2004). Recent works in philosophy of sciences and metaphysics have however reinstated force-realism as a viable and plausible option (Armstrong, 1997;Bigelow, Ellis, & Pargetter, 1988;Creary, 1981;Esfeld, 2013;Fales, 1990;Johansson, 2004;Massin, 2009Massin, , 2016Molnar, 2003;Strawson, 1987;J. J. Wilson, 2002J.…”

Section: Work On Cognate Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Towards a definition of efforts.

Massin¹

2017

Motivation Science

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Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept of effort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for an explicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at this definition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1 presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and argues that few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues that such a definition is now needed and proposes a basic methodology to arrive at it, whose first step is to make explicit the various tacit assumptions about effort made across sciences and ordinary thinking. Section 3 unearths 4 different conceptions of effort from research on effort so far: primitive-feelings accounts, comparator-based accounts, resource-based accounts and force-based accounts. It is then argued that the first 2 kinds of accounts, although interesting in their own right, are not strictly speaking about effort. Section 4 considers the 2 most promising general approaches to efforts: resource-based and force-based accounts. It argues that these accounts are not only compatible but actually extensionally equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains why force-based accounts should be regarded are more fundamental than resource-based accounts.

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Section: Work On Cognate Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…IV, Chaps. 1 & 6);and, more recently, Garnett, (1965), Hampshire (1982), Hamlyn (1990), Baldwin (1995), Russell (1995Russell ( , 1996, Cassam (1999), Bermudez (2000: 164), Smith (2002), Williams (2002: 136), Matthen (2005: 8), Massin (2009Massin ( , 2011c, Declerck (2014). (v) Absorption.…”

Section: Work On the Functions Of Effortsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a definition of efforts.

Massin¹

2017

Motivation Science

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“…243-245). As regards the contemporary discussion about the ontological status of Newtonian forces, see notably Bigelow, Ellis and Pargetter (1988), Wilson (2007) and Massin (2009). In the special theory of relativity, Einstein (1905) draws the consequences of the field solution to the problem of action at a distance in Newtonian mechanics. This theory is built on the following two principles: 1.…”

Section: Relativity Physics Quantum Non-locality and The Metaphysicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metaphysics of Science as Naturalized Metaphysics

Esfeld¹

2018

The Philosophy of Science

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This chapter outlines a metaphysics of science in the sense of a naturalized metaphysics. It considers in the first place the interplay of physics and metaphysics in Newtonian mechanics, then goes into the issues for the metaphysics of time that relativity physics raises, shows that what one considers as the referent of quantum theory depends on metaphysical considerations and finally explains how the stance that one takes with respect to objective modality and laws of nature shapes the options that are available for an ontology of quantum physics. In that way, this chapter seeks to make a case for a natural philosophy that treats physics and metaphysics as inseparable in the enquiry into the constitution of the world, there being neither a neo-positivist way of deducing metaphysics from the formalisms of physical theories, nor a neo-rationalist realm of investigation for metaphysics that is independent of physics.

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“…That is, provided that there are no forces of magnitude zero (and hence that a value of zero for 1 Papers addressing the issue, or closely related issues to do with causality, include Creary (1981), Bigelow et al (1988), Corry (2006), A. , Spurrett (2001), J. ), Massin (2009), and Schrenk (2011. 2 We will later touch on whether it is reasonable to ascribe this law to Newton.…”

Section: Introduction -Laws Of Motion Vs Force Lawsmentioning

confidence: 99%