The Metaphysics of Domains

Edwards, Douglas

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_4

Pluralisms in Truth and Logic 2018

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_4

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The Metaphysics of Domains

Douglas Edwards

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Cited by 3 publications

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“…8-12;Edwards 2018a, p. 125). 8 In other words, a list of pre-theoretic conceptual platitudes exhaustively describes the truth-concept. More than one kind of predicate may minimally satisfy the platitudes.…”

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A Dilemma for Determination Pluralism (or Dualism)

Merwe

2020

Axiomathes

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Douglas Edwards is arguably the most prominent contemporary advocate of moderate alethic pluralism.Significantly influenced by Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch, his work on the nature of truth has become widely discussed in the topical literature. Edwards labels his version of moderate alethic pluralism determination pluralism. At first blush, determination pluralism appears philosophically promising. The position deserves thoughtful consideration, particularly because of its capacity to accommodate the scope problem. I argue, however, that upon analysis the view is better understood as a form of metaphysical dualism or what I will call meta-dualism. Furthermore, determination pluralists face a dilemma; there appears to be an instability at the core of their dualistic model. On the one horn of the dilemma, they need a clear metaphysical demarcation at the interface of their two necessary domains. On the other horn, they seem to need to a metaphysically vague boundary at the interface of their two necessary domains. Determination pluralism needs substantial revision.

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“…Edwards (2018b) has endeavoured to give an account of the metaphysics of domains. However, he only discusses how one may, in principle, individuate what I have called micro-domains(physical, biological, moral, …”

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A Dilemma for Determination Pluralism (or Dualism)

Merwe

2020

Axiomathes

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Truth pluralism without domains

Gamester

2022

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Truth pluralists say that truth-bearers in different “discourses”, “domains”, “domains of discourse”, or “domains of inquiry” are apt to be true in different ways – for instance, that mathematical discourse or ethical discourse is apt to be true in a different way to ordinary descriptive or scientific discourse. Moreover, the notion of a “domain” is often explicitly employed in formulating pluralist theories of truth. Consequently, the notion of a “domain” is attracting increasing attention, both critical and constructive. I argue that this is a red herring. First, I identify the theoretical role for which pluralists appeal to domains, which is to answer what I call the “Individuation Problem”: saying what determines the way in which a particular truth-bearer is apt to be true. Second, I argue that pluralists need not appeal to domains for this purpose. I thus conclude that, despite the usual way of glossing the view, there is no role for the notion of a “domain” to play in the pluralist’s theory of truth. I argue that this defuses the “Problem of Mixed Atomics” and allows the pluralist to sidestep potentially intractable disputes about the nature of domains.

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Truth as none and many

Gamester

2023

Synthese

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Truth pluralists say that there are many ways to be true. Aaron Cotnoir (“Pluralism and Paradox” in: Pedersen and Wright (eds) Truth and pluralism: current debates, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) has suggested a “uniquely pluralist response to the liar”. The basic idea is to maintain that, if a sentence says of itself that it is not true in a certain way, then that sentence is not apt to be true in that way, but is instead apt to be true in a different way. While this is consistent with the basic tenets of truth pluralism, it is an open question whether or not it is amenable to any actual pluralist theory. The primary goal of this paper is to argue that Cotnoir's proposal is amenable to form-based pluralism, rather than domain-based pluralism. In particular, in Section 1, I argue that there are several serious obstacles in the way of the domain-based pluralist who wishes to endorse Cotnoir's proposal; in Section 2, I show how the form-based pluralist can overcome these difficulties. The secondary goal of the paper is to argue that most, if not all, substantivists about truth should find form-based pluralism independently attractive. As such, the possibility of a form-based pluralist solution to the liar is not merely a technical curiosity, but something in which substantivists about truth have a vested interest.

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The Metaphysics of Domains

Cited by 3 publications

References 22 publications

A Dilemma for Determination Pluralism (or Dualism)

A Dilemma for Determination Pluralism (or Dualism)

Truth pluralism without domains

Truth as none and many

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