The Merkel Government's Politics of the Past

Abstract

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The Concept of "Normality" in German Foreign Policy since Unification

“…In contrast to Schröder, Merkel made an unambiguous acknowledgement of German historical responsibility arising from the Nazi past and has not attempted to "normalize" the Nazi past. 79 She made a particular commitment to Germany's bilateral relationship with Israelwhich Bahr, for example, had not included in his elaboration of German national interests. She intensified Germany's relations with Israel and, together with the five members of the UN Security Council, took measures to put greater pressure on the Iranian regime to stop its nuclear program than Schröder had done.…”

Spiritualizing reason, rationalizing spirit: Muslim public intellectuals in the German far right

“…Despite these overlaps, the Germanness-as-rationality trope has dominated the liberal nationalism of post-reunification Germany (Fuchs et al., 2011) based on pride in economic achievement, allegiance to the German Constitution (Habermas, 2005), the working through of the Nazi past (Wittlinger, 2008), and in distinction to East German (Berdahl, 1999; Glaeser, 2000; Kalmar and Shoshan, 2020) and Muslim ‘others’ portrayed as having not yet progressed to the stage of liberalism (Özyürek, 2019). More recently, both East and West German intellectuals have been drawing on anti-Muslim racist repertoires to discursively build a new, sanitised, post-reunification notion of Germanness.…”

Angela Merkel’s discourse about the past: Implications for the construction of collective memory in Germany

“…The idea was controversial, in large part, due to the unclear role in the planning process of the League of German Expellees, a powerful and conservative group that has long called for recognition of the suffering of millions of Germans expelled from Eastern Europe at the end of the WWII. As a result of this discussion in the early days of the Merkel chancellorship, the question arose whether Merkel’s “politics of the past would be characterized by an emphasis on the memory of German suffering—possibly at the expense of memory of the Holocaust” (Wittlinger, 2008: 13). Moreover, there was speculation that Merkel would adopt a “very confident stance internationally which showed that the ‘burden’ of German history was not sufficient anymore to ensure some modesty vis-à-vis key victorious powers of World War II with regard to values …” (Wittlinger, 2008: 14).…”

“…As a result of this discussion in the early days of the Merkel chancellorship, the question arose whether Merkel’s “politics of the past would be characterized by an emphasis on the memory of German suffering—possibly at the expense of memory of the Holocaust” (Wittlinger, 2008: 13). Moreover, there was speculation that Merkel would adopt a “very confident stance internationally which showed that the ‘burden’ of German history was not sufficient anymore to ensure some modesty vis-à-vis key victorious powers of World War II with regard to values …” (Wittlinger, 2008: 14). Wittlinger concluded that, in the first 1 or 2 years of her chancellorship, Merkel’s approach to the politics of the past was characterized by unambiguous acknowledgment of German historical responsibility owing to Nazism and the Holocaust.…”

“… 6. See Ruth Wittlinger’s (2008) discussion. This episode follows a more than two-decades-long debate in Germany between those—typically on the Left of the political spectrum—who argue that Germany’s past obliges it to be contrite and those—typically on the Right—who believe it is time for Germany to see itself and be treated as a normal, national interest–driven country. …”