has presented enormous challenges across the globe that led to a number of shared lessons to be learnt. Yet, we are inundated with comparative, if not competitive, accounts that characterize national pandemic responses as inherent and unique to certain nation states, which we argue that led to COVID-exceptionalism. This article challenges a number of 'cultural' explanations of South Korea's 'successful' responses to COVID-19 crisis. The popular narrative has been that Korea's cluster-based mitigation strategy was sustained by rigorous contact tracing and mass testing systems, and this was made possible by three distinctive elements of pandemic preparedness: 1) Korean 'culture' of normalizing face-covering, 2) Korean citizens' consensus of prioritizing public health to privacy, and 3) Korea's advanced IT infrastructure enabling effective and efficient digital contact tracing. By debunking the three myths, we demonstrate why neither the Asian 'authoritarian advantages' thesis nor the equally problematic counter-argument of 'Asian civility' adequately captures the reality of South Korea's reaction to the COVID pandemic. Attending to social, political, and material contingencies, we contribute to the STS discussion over how the ways in which risks are conceptualized as manageable and measurable objects can produce particular modes of allocating responsibilities for risk mitigation, when dealing with relatively unknown virus. We conclude that COVID-exceptionalism may cause not only the issue of reinforcing '(East) Asian'/'Western' stereotypes, but also other problems such as implicitly granting political impunity to those responsible for coordinating COVID-19 responses.