Advocates of sensory measurement claim that the fractionatioh procedure permits the assignment of conventional numerals to represent the magnitude of sensory experience. Others have disputed this claim, stating that such numerals do not carry conventional meaning until shown to do so. Campbell and Irwin (i), for example, in discussing the sone scale, say that if such a scale, based on guesses of J, represents equally well guesses of | or A, then there would be some justification for the assumption that the 'i' has meaning in the conventional sense. But since this is not true and because other conditions are not fulfilled, ". . . subjective measurements of loudness in numerical terms . , . are mutually inconsistent and cannot be the basis of measurement."This criticism has not been satisfactorily invalidated. As Campbell and Irwin state, there are inconsistencies among the numerical values based on various types of estimates. Nearly all of the fractionation expert* ments calling for estimates other than J have made use of the loudness continuum. These different sets of data have shown varying degrees of agree-