The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

Barclay, Michael J.; Smith, Clifford W.

doi:10.2307/2329421

Cited by 366 publications

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“…Consistent with our model prediction, the effect of asset beta on debt maturity further strengthens to 0.103 after controlling for book leverage (column (3)), implying that a one-standard deviation increase in asset beta raises the long-term debt share by 6.5%. The coefficient estimate on asset volatility is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Stohs and Mauer (1996).…”

Section: Debt Maturity 421 Cross Section Of Debt Maturitysupporting

confidence: 70%

“…Earlier studies by Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996)) have documented a negative relation between debt maturity and measures of firm volatility (such as the volatility of asset returns and earnings changes). Our results suggest that this negative relation is driven by the negative relation between debt maturity and idiosyncratic volatility, which is consistent with the theory of debt maturity based on information asymmetries.…”

Section: Debt Maturity 421 Cross Section Of Debt Maturitymentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Following previous studies of debt maturity (see Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Stohs and Mauer (1996)), we construct the benchmark measure of debt maturity using the long-term debt share, which is the percentage of total debt that are due in more than 3 years (ldebt3y). For robustness, we also measure long-term debt share using the percentage of total debt due in more than n years (ldebtny), with n = 1, 2, 4, 5.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the empirical side, Barclay and Smith (1995) find that firms with higher asset volatility choose shorter debt maturity. They do not separately examine the effects of systematic and idiosyncratic risk on debt maturity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Systematic Risk, Debt Maturity, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads

Chen¹,

Yang

2012

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We build a dynamic capital structure model to study the link between firms' systematic risk exposures and their time-varying debt maturity choices, as well as its implications for the term structure of credit spreads. Compared to short-term debt, long-term debt helps reduce rollover risks, but its illiquidity raises the costs of financing. With both default risk and liquidity costs changing over the business cycle, our calibrated model implies that debt maturity is pro-cyclical, firms with high systematic risk favor longer debt maturity, and that these firms will have more stable maturity structures over the cycle. Moreover, pro-cyclical maturity variation can significantly amplify the impact of aggregate shocks on the term structure of credit spreads, especially for firms with high beta, high leverage, or a lumpy maturity structure. We provide empirical evidence for the model predictions on both debt maturity and credit spreads.

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Section: Debt Maturity 421 Cross Section Of Debt Maturitysupporting

confidence: 70%

Section: Debt Maturity 421 Cross Section Of Debt Maturitymentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Systematic Risk, Debt Maturity, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads

Chen¹,

Yang

2012

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“…Todavia, estes reconhecem que o trabalho daqueles foi talvez o primeiro a sistematizar analiticamente a teoria da agência na escolha das formas de financiamento das empresas, sendo que este trabalho serviu como base teórica para muitos trabalhos posteriores (JENSEN, 1986;STULZ, 1990;MEHRAN, 1992;LELAND, 1998;MAO, 2003;LINS;ROPER, 2004 (MYERS, 1977;BARCLAY;SMITH Jr., 1995;STOHS;MAUER, 1996). Isto porque, com prazo de maturidade de dívidas diferenciado, a empresa poderia mostrar a qualidade de seus investimentos e, portanto, sua verdadeira intenção com relação a sua intenção de expropriar, ou não, riqueza de seus acionistas.…”

Section: -Estudos Baseados Nos Problemas De Agênciaunclassified

Estrutura de capital e assimetria de informação: efeitos da governança corporativa

Candido¹

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AGRADECIMENTOSAgradeço a Deus por tudo que me tem dado a oportunidade de estar em mais esta etapa da vida.Aos meus pais, por todo o ensinamento e apoio ao longo de minha vida.À minha irmã, que ainda está iniciando uma linda fase de sua vida e que a aproveite bem. (1958, 1963), os estudos sobre a estrutura de financiamento das empresas ganharam impulso sem, contudo, desenvolver-se num horizonte único. Pelo contrário, novas linhas de pesquisa foram desenvolvidas, com previsões teóricas sendo comumente testadas empiricamente. Neste sentido, este trabalho busca avançar neste campo de estudo, a fim de promover alguma contribuição acerca do entendimento da estrutura de capital das empresas. Em especial, este trabalho adota a abordagem relacionada com a assimetria de informação entre provedores de recursos (credores e acionistas) e os gestores dessas empresas. Adota-se a governança corporativa (G.C.) como um meio de minorar os efeitos dessa assimetria informacional pois, uma das premissas pelas boas práticas de G.C. é a redução de assimetria de informação entre os financiadores e os tomadores de recursos na empresa. Pela aplicação de um método de verificação empírico em uma amostra de empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, encontraram-se evidências de que a G.C. atua como um meio de acesso a outras fontes de financiamento, pois as empresas com melhores práticas de G.C. apresentaram menor endividamento. Entretanto, os resultados apresentam sensibilidade à técnica estatística utilizada, sendo assim necessário maior aprofundamento em futuras pesquisas sobre a forma como verificar as previsões teóricas.Palavras-Chave: Estrutura de capital; Governança corporativa; Assimetria de Informação. Since the Modigliani and Miller"s works (1958, 1963), the studies about the capital structure got a impulse, without development in a single way. In contrast, new lines of research had developed, with theoretical forecasts commonly tested empirically. In this way, this work aim contribute in this field of study and give some advance on the understand in the choice of capital structure by the enterprises. Specially, this work adopt the asymmetric information line of research between who finance (creditors and shareholders) and that uses the capital. It is adopted the corporate governance (C.G.) as a mechanism the minimize the effects of this asymmetric information between who give and get the capital. By the application of a method of empiric verification in a sample constituted by enterprises with shares negotiated in the market, was found evidence that C.G. facilitates the access of other financing form than debt. Then, enterprises with better practices of C.G. would have less debt. But, the results are sensible to the statistic method used, then, it is necessary a deep in future research that could verify the theoretical previsions.

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Collateral and Credit Rationing: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies as a Guide for Future Research

Steijvers¹,

Voordeckers²

2011

Issues in Finance

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The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

Cited by 366 publications

References 0 publications

Systematic Risk, Debt Maturity, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads

Systematic Risk, Debt Maturity, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads

Estrutura de capital e assimetria de informação: efeitos da governança corporativa

Collateral and Credit Rationing: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies as a Guide for Future Research

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