The Mathematical Structure of the World: The World as Graph

Dipert, Randall R.

doi:10.2307/2564553

Cited by 54 publications

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“…3 See, in particular, Ladyman (1998) and French & Ladyman (2003). For another version of a radical metaphysics of structural realism, see Dipert (1997).…”

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confidence: 99%

Moderate structural realism about space-time

2006

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This paper sets out a moderate version of metaphysical structural realism that stands in contrast to both the epistemic structural realism of Worrall and the -radical -ontic structural realism of French and Ladyman. According to moderate structural realism, objects and relations (structure) are on the same ontological footing, with the objects being characterized only by the relations in which they stand. We show how this position fares well as regards philosophical arguments, avoiding the objections against the other two versions of structural realism. In particular, we set out how this position can be applied to space-time, providing for a convincing understanding of space-time points in the standard tensor formulation of general relativity as well as in the fibre bundle formulation. Moderate in contrast to radical structural realismStructural realism is a position in the philosophy of science that has been much debated recently. It is the view that only structure in the sense of the relations that are instantiated in the world is real or at least is all that we can know. The latter position is known as epistemic structural realism, the former one as ontic structural realism (this distinction goes back to Ladyman 1998). The main motivation of epistemic structural realism is to steer a middle course between the no miracle argument for scientific realism and the argument from pessimistic induction for instrumentalism. The main motivation -and application -of the form of ontic structural realism that has been developed hitherto is the interpretation of quantum physics. The aim of this paper is to set out (1) a moderate ontic or metaphysical structural realism that puts objects on the same footing as structure and (2) to apply this position to space-time, arguing in particular that it leads to a convincing view about spacetime points. The current discussion on structural realism goes back to Worrall (1989, in particular 117-123). Worrall's aim is to pay heed to both the argument from pessimistic induction -that is, the claim that since most of our past scientific theories have turned out to be false, it is likely that our present and future scientific theories will endure the same fate -and the no miracle argument, that is, the claim that the predictive success of our scientific theories would be a miracle if they were not tracking truth. Worrall's middle way consists in three theses: 1) Structure in the sense of relations among physical objects and as captured by the mathematical equations of a scientific theory is all that we can know. 2) There is continuity in our views about structure despite theory change: the views about structure of a predecessor theory can be construed as an approximation of the views about structure of the successor theory. 3) We cannot know the intrinsic properties of the physical objects that underlie structure.

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“…3 See, in particular, Ladyman (1998) and French & Ladyman (2003). For another version of a radical metaphysics of structural realism, see Dipert (1997).…”

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confidence: 99%

Moderate structural realism about space-time

2006

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“…For another contemporary version of a radical metaphysics of relations see Dipert (1997). order to get this result, we do not have to jettison the admission of relata, that is, things which stand in the relations.…”

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confidence: 99%

Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations

Esfeld

2004

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in

117

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This paper argues for a metaphysics of relations based on a characterization of quantum entanglement in terms of non-separability, thereby regarding entanglement as a sort of holism. By contrast to a radical metaphysics of relations, the position set out in this paper recognizes things that stand in the relations, but claims that, as far as the relations are concerned, there is no need for these things to have qualitative intrinsic properties underlying the relations. This position thus opposes a metaphysics of individual things that are characterized by intrinsic properties. A principal problem of the latter position is that it seems that we cannot gain any knowledge of these properties insofar as they are intrinsic. Against this background, the rationale behind a metaphysics of relations is to avoid a gap between epistemology and metaphysics. Keywords: entanglement, holism, intrinsic properties, metaphysics, non-separability, relations, structural realism IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to propose a philosophical characterization of quantum entanglement within a broader metaphysical framework. The framework is the one of a metaphysics of relations in contrast to a metaphysics of individual things that are characterized by intrinsic properties. A metaphysics of relations is a minority view in contemporary philosophy. According to the mainstream of metaphysical thought, the world consists of independent individual things that are embedded in space-time. These things are individuals, because (a) they have a spatio-temporal location, (b) they are a subject of the predication of properties each and (c) there are some qualitative properties by means of which each of these things is distinguished from all the other ones (at least the spatio-temporal location is such a property). Qualitative properties are all and only those properties whose instantiation does not depend on the existence of any particular individual; properties such as being that individual are hence excluded. These things are independent, because their basic properties are intrinsic ones. Basic properties are fundamental in that they are not reducible to other properties, and they are not disjunctive; that is to say, properties such as "being round or square" are excluded. Intrinsic are all and only those qualitative properties that a thing has irrespective of whether or not there are other contingent things; all other qualitative properties are extrinsic or relational. That is to say: Having or lacking an intrinsic property is independent of accompaniment or loneliness. 1 1 See Langton and Lewis (1998) and for a refinement Lewis (2001).

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“…factual political or technical networks) in the sense that it could refer to general patterns and mechanisms. If graph the orists explain the whole world in the sense of a "theory of everything", their explanations are perplexingly abstract, without carrying much information (Dipert, 1997).…”

Section: From Network Metaphors To Network Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Relationalism in Political Theory and Research: The Challenge of Networked Politics and Policy-Making

Schneider¹

2015

10.14746/pp

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Political theory and research approaches are in most cases not explicit in all respects, but are usually shaped by implicit background theories and scientific worldviews, e.g. presuppositions and par adigms. Examples are idealism, materialism or institutionalism. A fairly new perspective in this regard is relationalism. This way of thinking, in its ontological orientation, conceives the world only in terms of relations. Research programmes with a relationalist orientation put this idea into practice with methods of social network analysis which are more and more used also in political science. Several variants of this new -ism and type of network thinking are presented in this paper in a critical perspective. Relationalism is ultimately seen as fruitful perspective, but is seen as limited in its explanatory power, though. It should therefore always be combined with other approaches and perspectives.

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The Mathematical Structure of the World: The World as Graph

Cited by 54 publications

References 0 publications

Moderate structural realism about space-time

Moderate structural realism about space-time

Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations

Relationalism in Political Theory and Research: The Challenge of Networked Politics and Policy-Making

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