The Mathematical Structure of Integrated Information Theory

Kleiner, Johannes; Tull, Sean

doi:10.48550/arxiv.2002.07655

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 12 publications

(30 reference statements)

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“…Further generalizations have been given by Kleiner and Tull (2020). These models do not yet give a complete mapping from physical states to Q-shapes, but they come closer to doing this than standard IIT.…”

Section: Combining Iit With Quantum Mechanics 10mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function

Chalmers¹,

McQueen²

2021

Preprint

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Does consciousness collapse the quantum wave function? This idea was taken seriously by John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner but is now widely dismissed. We develop the idea by combining a mathematical theory of consciousness (integrated information theory) with an account of quantum collapse dynamics (continuous spontaneous localization). Simple versions of the theory are falsified by the quantum Zeno effect, but more complex versions remain compatible with empirical evidence. In principle, versions of the theory can be tested by experiments with quantum computers. The upshot is not that consciousness-collapse interpretations are clearly correct, but that there is a research program here worth exploring.

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Section: Combining Iit With Quantum Mechanics 10mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thanks to Johannes Kleiner. Our calculations are intended to followZanardi, Tomka, and Venuti (2018) andKleiner and Tull (2020).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function

Chalmers¹,

McQueen²

2021

Preprint

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“…Due to IIT's level of formalization as a theory, it has triggered the most in-depth responses, expansions, and criticisms (Cerullo, 2015;Bayne, 2018;Mediano et al, 2019;Kleiner and Tull, 2020) since well-formalized theories are much easier to criticize than non-formalized theories (a positive attribute). Recently one criticism levied against IIT was based on the fact that the theory predicts feedfoward neural networks have zero Φ and recurrent neural networks have non-zero Φ.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Falsification and consciousness

Kleiner,

Hoel

2020

Preprint

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The search for a scientific theory of consciousness should result in theories that are falsifiable. However, here we show that falsification is especially problematic for theories of consciousness. We formally describe the standard experimental setup for testing these theories. Based on a theory's application to some physical system, such as the brain, testing requires comparing a theory's predicted experience (given some internal observables of the system like brain imaging data) with an inferred experience (using report or behavior). If there is a mismatch between inference and prediction, a theory is falsified. We show that if inference and prediction are independent, it follows that any minimally informative theory of consciousness is automatically falsified. This is deeply problematic since the field's reliance on report or behavior to infer conscious experiences implies such independence, so this fragility affects many contemporary theories of consciousness. Furthermore, we show that if inference and prediction are strictly dependent, it follows that a theory is unfalsifiable. This affects theories which claim consciousness to be determined by report or behavior. Finally, we explore possible ways out of this dilemma.

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“… See Zanardi, Tomka, and Venuti (2018),Kleiner and Tull (2020), andChalmers and McQueen (2022). Some earlier attempts to give quantum physical definitions of Φ can be found inTegmark (2015),Tegmark (2016) andKremnizer and Ranchin (2015).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

When do parts form wholes? Integrated information as the restriction on mereological composition

McQueen¹,

Tsuchiya²

2023

Preprint

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Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT). We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT-restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT-restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system.

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The Mathematical Structure of Integrated Information Theory

Cited by 3 publications

References 12 publications

Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function

Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function

Falsification and consciousness

When do parts form wholes? Integrated information as the restriction on mereological composition

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