The many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta‐analysis of EU and UK cases

Abstract

Research on regulation has crossed paths with the literature on policy instruments, showing that regulatory policy instruments contain cognitive and normative beliefs about policy. Thus, their usage stacks the deck in favor of one type of actor or one type of regulatory solution. In this article, we challenge the assumption that there is a predetermined relationship between ideas, regulatory policy instruments, and outcomes. We argue that different combinations of conditions lead to different outcomes, depending on how actors use the instrument. Empirically, we analyze 31 EU and UK case studies of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) -a regulatory policy instrument that has been pivotal in the so-called better regulation movement. We distinguish four main usages of RIA, that is, political, instrumental, communicative, and perfunctory. We find that in our sample instrumental usage is not so rare and that the contrast between communicative and political usages is less stark than is commonly thought. In terms of policy recommendations, our analysis suggests that there may be different paths to desirable outcomes. Policymakers should therefore explore different combinations of conditions leading to the usages they deem desirable rather than arguing for a fixed menu of variables.

Accountability in an Independent Regulatory Setting: The Use of Impact Assessment in the Regulation of Financial Reporting in the UK

“…The literature on IA (Radaelli 2010;Dunlop et al 2012) provides support for this argument by reference to a range of aspects which highlight the potential role of IA as an accountability instrument. Firstly, prior studies of IA indicate that, in the context of delegated policy making, the instrument can promote greater and more dynamic forms of political control over the regulator's decisions by the political principal, such as government, an upper-level executive or affiliated regulatory authority.…”

“…Finally, organizations such as IRAs may use knowledge symbolically to gain legitimacy in the eyes of significant stakeholders or other policy actors and also to conform to the logic of appropriateness that encourages them to make an appropriate response to external pressures and expectations (Schrefler 2010). While, as we discussed earlier, IA can be used to project the image of rational policy making (Radaelli 2010), prior studies have also demonstrated that the ideas behind IA and the actual application of those are often decoupled, pointing to the widespread occurrence of what Dunlop et al (2012) termed the 'perfunctory' use of the instrument. In this vein, Schrefler (2010) further argues that the reliance on knowledge instruments (such as IA) can have a protective function in certain policy sectors (for example, regulation of professional services) where there is strong isomorphic pressure on regulators to be seen to make reference to expertise and research findings.…”

“…In this regard, Schrefler's (2010) nuanced account of the underlying rationales behind the use of knowledge in the context of IRAs provides a useful reference point for our understanding of how exactly IA may help create and maintain the image that knowledgeintensity is an inherent property of independent policy making. Firstly, IA may help facilitate instrumental use of knowledge by IRAs by establishing a connection between research and policy decisions which ensures that ''once policy problems are identified, knowledge is the means by which to select the best solution'' (Schrefler 2010, p. 14) (for a similar view, see also Dunlop et al 2012). In this regard, IA can help IRAs achieve their short-term objective to be seen as producing qualitatively better policy outputs as well as the long-term objective of increasing a general understanding of the issues at hand.…”

“…Importantly, they also point out that IA represents one such accountability tool. Indeed, one of the key accountabilityrelated properties of IA which is particularly relevant for IRAs (as discussed in the previous section) has to do with its ability to maintain perceptions of a knowledge-intensive regulatory process which is informed by a substantive understanding of the policy issues at hand and, importantly, to help regulators justify any resulting policy solutions by feeding into such perceptions (Froud et al 1998;Radaelli 2010;Dunlop et al 2012). In this regard, Schrefler's (2010) nuanced account of the underlying rationales behind the use of knowledge in the context of IRAs provides a useful reference point for our understanding of how exactly IA may help create and maintain the image that knowledgeintensity is an inherent property of independent policy making.…”

“…IA guidance in many countries, including the UK, requires that an IA report be published as part of the formal public consultation process. Dunlop et al (2012), for example, point to the communicative element of modern IA as particularly important, with open consultation and ''notice-and-comment'' arrangements facilitating ''dialogic'' encounters between regulators and stakeholders (p. 27). In this regard, IA has a capacity to promote a ''pluralist logic'' of accountability, where the public consultation attends to the information demands of the political principal but also of a wider range of stakeholders, such as businesses, social groups, judiciary institutions and others.…”