The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics

Lyons, Gene M.; Finer, S. E.

doi:10.2307/40198946

Cited by 7 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…The paper closely relates to the literature on the guardianship dilemma, namely, stronger external threats increase the need for a powerful military, but a powerful military may also endanger the regime's survival (Finer 1988;Feaver 1999;Besley and Robinson 2010). At one extreme, it could deprive the state of a military altogether, as it has done in Costa Rica.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 97%

Solving the guardianship dilemma by war

Gao

2021

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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This article develops a new theory of how dictators can solve the guardianship dilemma. I study a dynamic game to show that the dictator may build a large army and deal with the guardianship dilemma by resorting to international conflicts. Specifically, when a military revolt is imminent, the dictator can obtain enough resources to buy off the military by attacking and ultimately defeating his international opponent. The framework thus shows that a weakly institutionalized polity may either have a small military or have a large military and be more aggressive on the international stage.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 97%

Solving the guardianship dilemma by war

Gao

2021

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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“…Major drivers of coup risk include economic development, (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005), weak civil society (Belkin and Schoffer, 2003), crises in civilian politics (Finer and Edward, 1973), ethnic conflict (Harkness, 2018), officer grievances (Albrecht and Eibl, 2018;White, 2020), and security environment (Piplani and Talmadge, 2016). In response to coup risk, leaders coup proof.…”

Section: Coups and Coup-proofingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Getting a Seat at the Table: Changes in Military Participation in Government and Coups

White

2023

Research & Politics

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Why do coups happen and how can state leaders affect their likelihood? Existing research focuses on structural factors as well as “coup-proofing” as drivers of coup risk. I argue that the literature misses an important alternative avenue by which leaders affect the likelihood that their militaries remove them from office: adding or removing military officers from the government. When leaders bring military officers into the government, they signal to the military that there is a peaceful path to sharing power and provide an alternative to coups. In contrast, removing military officers from government dramatically increases the risk of a coup attempt as the military retaliates against the leader’s power grab. I test this theory using cross-national data that captures changes in military representation in national cabinets and state councils from 1969 to 2008 and find mixed support. In line with the theory, there is strong evidence that large reductions in the military’s government positions lead to coup attempts, and more modest evidence that large increases reduce coup attempts. However, contrary to expectations, the results also suggest that small increases in military government positions increase the risk of a coup.

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“…Whereas the extent to which military education inculcates civic virtues is disputable, there is little doubt about it instilling traditional military virtues (Finer 2002; Leander 2004). The development of a sectarian military culture is not solely the unintended consequence of geographic segregation during the conscription period, but is deliberately strengthened by the military organization itself, through both behavioral practices and rational arguments.…”

Section: Conscription and Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

Military Culture and Institutional Trust: Evidence from Conscription Reforms in Europe

Bove

Leo

Giani

2022

American J Political Sci

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Does military conscription reduce the distance between the ordinary citizen and the state? Decades after its abolition, numerous European policy makers from across the political spectrum advocate the reintroduction of conscription to foster civic virtues, despite a lack of empirical evidence in this respect. Leveraging quasi-random variation in conscription reforms across 15 European countries, we find that cohorts of men drafted just before its abolition display significantly and substantially lower institutional trust than cohorts of men who were just exempted. At the same time, ending conscription had no effect on institutional trust among women from comparable cohorts. Results are neither driven by more favorable attitudes toward the government, nor by educational choices. Instead, this civil-military gap unfolds through the formation of a homogeneous community with uniform values. We argue that reintroducing a compulsory military service may not produce the effects anticipated by its advocates.

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The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Solving the guardianship dilemma by war

Solving the guardianship dilemma by war

Getting a Seat at the Table: Changes in Military Participation in Government and Coups

Military Culture and Institutional Trust: Evidence from Conscription Reforms in Europe

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