The Macedonian–Albanian political frontier: the re‐articulation of post‐Yugoslav political identities

Abstract

Abstract. The article examines the re‐articulation of national identity in Macedonia since its independence in 1992. Both ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian political identities have been engaged in a complex process of redefinition. Two ethnic groups had previously been strongly influenced by the Marxist paradigm and its Yugoslav official interpretation. During the 1990s, the elements of the old paradigm were combined with elements of the new – liberal democratic – concepts of nationhood. While some of the concepts developed within the old Yugoslav framework are still in use, the new liberal‐democratic political paradigm finds it difficult to include them into an official discourse on nationhood. At the same time, introduction of the concepts inherent to the liberal‐democratic paradigm has disturbed the fragile balance achieved through the old Yugoslav narrative. In new circumstances, the ethnic Macedonians transformed themselves from the ‘constitutive nation’ to ‘majority’. However, the ethnic Albanians found it more difficult to accept the status of ‘minority’, which was once (in Yugoslav Marxist narrative) considered to be politically incorrect. Thus, they insist on being recognised as a ‘nation’, equal to ethnic Macedonians. In its essence, the conflict in Macedonia is – to a large extent – a conflict between two different concepts of what is Macedonia and who are Macedonians. The questions posed are: is the minority (ethnic Albanians) part of the nation? Could two nations exist peacefully within one state? The article maps out differences between two different discourses on the identity of the new Macedonian state.

Ethnic representational priorities and political engagement in deeply divided societies

“…Not only is substantive representation a bigger motivator for Macedonians, but Macedonians place little value on additional descriptive representation, presumably because they already have it. In a sense, descriptive representation may not motivate Macedonians because Macedonia is their ethnic homeland, a place where descriptive representation is taken as a given (Adamson & Jovic, 2004).…”

North Macedonia after the Ohrid Framework Agreement

“…Within this context, Macedonian political elites were supported in the view that ethnic Albanians and other minorities in the country already enjoyed minority rights in line with the highest standards of international legislation (Daskalovski, 2013). On the other hand, the Albanians were resolute that the new Constitution was favouring ethnic Macedonians as the only "constitutive nation," a "majority" in the state (Adamson and Jović, 2004), and called for the restoration of their rights guaranteed under the 1974 Constitution. The problem was growing worse, and the indolent, factionalist attitude of Macedonian politicians only contributed to the gradual radicalization of the situation in regions mainly inhabited by ethnic Albanians, namely in western Macedonia.…”

State Ownership and “State-Sharing”: The Role of Collective Identities and the Sociopolitical Cleavage between Ethnic Macedonians and Ethnic Albanians in the Republic of North Macedonia

“…Although Macedonian nationalism was a relatively new phenomenon, the former socialist political elite saw independence “as the next stage in the historical development of the Macedonian nation toward full statehood” (Adamson and Jović 2004, 301). While keeping in mind that, throughout history, Macedonians have incessantly been contested as a nation—above all by neighboring Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece—it is plausible to say the Macedonians’ identity frustrations saw a partial decrease with the implementation of “constitutional nationalism,” namely “a constitutional and legal structure that privileges the members of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state” (Hayden 1992, 655).…”

“…The Macedonian elite tried to balance the ethnic nation-state narrative with the recognition of minorities, enunciating the importance of peaceful interethnic relations; however, the de facto marginalization of smaller groups was likely to increase tensions and hostile attitudes. Indeed, the state-building criteria used by the nascent post-Yugoslav state was, unsurprisingly, more ethnic than civic; “unsurprisingly” because Macedonia, although ethnically heterogeneous, was commonly seen as the state of ethnic Macedonians (Koneska 2014) and, furthermore, a civic understanding of the nations within the republic—meaning that a Macedonian civic nation inclusive of ethnic Macedonians, ethnic Albanians, and other groups—was never attempted nor promoted (Adamson and Jović 2004). Not only did this supranational identity not exist, but it objectively also could not be developed from scratch and in such a short time period, since the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia happened very quickly.…”