The <i>A Priori</i> Without Magic

Abstract

The distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is an old and influential one. But both the distinction itself and the crucial notion of a priori knowledge face powerful philosophical challenges. Many philosophers worry that accepting the a priori is tantamount to accepting epistemic magic. In contrast, this Element argues that the a priori can be formulated clearly, made respectable, and used to do important epistemological work. The author's conception of the a priori and its role falls short of what some historical proponents of the notion may have hoped for, but it allows us to accept and use the notion without abandoning either naturalism or empiricism, broadly understood. This Element argues that we can accept and use the a priori without magic.

Logical Conventionalism

“…For further discussion see Carnap 1963, Burgess 2004, Warren 2018, 2022a section 6, and SOS section 7.V.…”

“…For further discussion see Harman 1986, Peacocke 1992, Horwich 1998, Schiffer 2003, Warren 2022a section 6, and SOS section 3.I.…”

The independence solution to grue

“…For criticism of redefinitions, seeJackson (1975). 11 I fully explain this terminology inWarren (2022).12 The end of Dorst (2016) is an exception.…”