The Low Fertility Trap Hypothesis. Forces that May Lead to Further Postponement and Fewer Births in Europe

Abstract

This paper starts from the assessment that there is no good theory in the social sciences that would tell us whether fertility in low-fertility countries is likely to recover in the future, stay around its current level or continue to fall. This question is key to the discussion whether or not governments should take action aimed at influencing the fertility rate. To enhance the scholarly discussion in this field, the paper introduces a clearly defined hypothesis which describes plausible self-reinforcing mechanisms that would result, if unchecked, in a continued decrease of the number of births in the countries affected. This hypothesis has three components: a demographic one based on the negative population growth momentum, i.e., the fact that fewer potential mothers in the future will result in fewer births; a sociological one based on the assumption that ideal family size for the younger cohorts is declining as a consequence of the lower actual fertility they see in previous cohorts; and an economic one based on the first part of Easterlin's (1980) relative income hypothesis, namely, that fertility results from the combination of aspirations and expected income, and assuming that aspirations of young adults are on an increasing trajectory while the expected income for the younger cohorts declines, partly as a consequence of population ageing induced by low fertility. All three factors would work towards a downward spiral in births in the future. If there is reason to assume that such mechanisms will indeed be at work, then this should strengthen the motivation of governments to take immediate action (possibly through policies addressing the tempo effect) in order to still escape from the expected trap. *

Sub-Replacement Fertility Intentions in Austria

“…Such a possibility, however, has been outlined with respect to changes in ideal family size by Lutz et al (2006) who sketch out a hypothesis of recurrent decline in ideal and realised family size, supported by socialisation of younger cohorts in an environment with progressively shrinking numbers of children. It is likely that the same set of factors would also affect fertility intentions, leading to their substantial decline.…”

“…Bongaarts 2001). A marked decline in intended family size would, on the other hand, make a substantial future increase in fertility considerably less likely; in fact, it may precede yet further decline in fertility (Lutz et al 2006). …”

Low Fertility and Long-Run Growth in an Economy with a Large Public Sector

“…A generally accepted theory to generate predictions on fertility is missing today. The LFTH suggested by Lutz et al (2006) offers a framework to structure further research around the micro-macro feedbacks. There are difficulties, however, since we cannot in general observe these feedbacks in isolation.…”

“…Lutz et al (2006), that countries with very low fertility (below say 1.5) may be caught in a low fertility trap (the Low Fertility Trap Hypothesis, LFTH). This builds on the observation by inter alia McDonald (2005) that a recovery towards replacement levels seems to become increasingly difficult to achieve in countries with very low fertility.…”

How Education Drives Demography and Knowledge Informs Projections

“…This also seems related to the timing of the onset of childbearing. Education could also have self-reinforcing effects on fertility timing, where increasing levels of education create a race where one needs to have more and more schooling in order to be "on par" or better than others of the same sex-cohort group (Lutz et al 2006;Skirbekk & KC 2012). This can imply that education results in fertility being increasingly postponed for each successive generation, since education levels gradually increase and more years of schooling are needed to reach a given percentile in the educational distribution.…”