The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality

Nelkin, Dana Kay

doi:10.1215/00318108-109-3-373

Cited by 168 publications

(110 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Bird's claim that his account gains motivation from its explanatory power rests primarily on two points. First, Bird suggests that it offers an improvement on Dana Nelkin's (2000) unied response to the knowledge and justication versions of the lottery paradox (2007: 100-3). Second, he argues that it explains the truth of an intuition typically taken to support internalist conceptions of justication over externalist ones (2007: 97-100).…”

Section: Jujumentioning

confidence: 99%

Justification as ‘Would-Be’ Knowledge

McGlynn¹

2012

Episteme

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In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. A further aim is to defend a more traditional conception, according to which justification is a matter of sufficiently high evidential likelihood. In particular, I suggest that this conception of justification offers a plausible account of lottery cases: cases in which one believes a true proposition – for example that one's lottery ticket will lose – on the basis of probabilistic evidence.

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Section: Jujumentioning

confidence: 99%

Justification as ‘Would-Be’ Knowledge

McGlynn¹

2012

Episteme

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“…Cf. Nelkin [2000], Sutton [2007], Smith [2010], and Littlejohn [2012]. As we are not here interested in the nature of justification, we are happy to use 'justified' in a quasi-stipulative way so as to avoid these difficulties.…”

Section: Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability

2012

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“…This "lottery intuition" has exerted considerable influence in recent epistemology. It has been endorsed by Cohen (1998), Dretske (1970), Nelkin (2000), Nozick (1981), Pritchard (2005), Smith (2010), Vogel (1990), Williamson (2000), Williamson (2009b), and many others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study

Ebert

Smith

Durbach

2017

Philosophical Psychology

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In this paper, we present the results of two surveys that investigate subjects' judgments about what can be known or justifiably believed about lottery outcomes on the basis of statistical evidence, testimonial evidence, and "mixed" evidence, while considering possible anchoring and priming effects. We discuss these results in light of seven distinct hypotheses that capture various claims made by philosophers about lay people's lottery judgments. We conclude by summarizing the main findings, pointing to future research, and comparing our findings to recent studies by Turri and Friedman.

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The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality

Cited by 168 publications

References 10 publications

Justification as ‘Would-Be’ Knowledge

Justification as ‘Would-Be’ Knowledge

Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability

Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study

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