The looks of a winner: Beauty and electoral success

Berggren, Niclas; Jordahl, Henrik; Poutvaara, Panu

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.11.002

Cited by 318 publications

(369 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(26 reference statements)

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“…In our model, however, the up-front payment is not a bond but a sunk cost. Similar to our model, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue that independent judiciaries are vulnerable to taking bribes. While they focus on explaining why independent and dependent judiciaries have come about (in 12th century England and France) we study their affect on the distributions of rents.…”

supporting

confidence: 59%

“…According to La Porta et al (1999) and Djankov et al (2002), GNP per capita, the absolute value of the latitude of the country and the religions Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam may help explain corruption, bureaucratic delays and regulation. We therefore control for these variables (logGNP, LAT, PROT, CATH and MUSLIM).…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…La Porta et al (2004) find that independent judiciaries reduce the number of steps that a start-up firm has to comply with in order to start operating legaly. In addition, La Porta et al (1999) and Djankov et al (2002) show that compared to common law countries, civil law countries (which tend to have more dependent judiciaries (La Porta el al. 2004)) have worse regulation and more bureaucratic delays.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In line with North and Weingast (1989), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and La Porta et al (2004) we define an independent judiciary as one that can rule against the central authority. In particular, it can avoid reporting theft to the central authority in exchange for taking bribes from stealing officials.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

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Judiciaries in corrupt societies

Priks

2010

Econ Gov

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may JUDICIARIES IN CORRUPT SOCIETIES AbstractRecent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption. We provide empirical evidence which is in line with this result.JEL Code: H11, K40.

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supporting

confidence: 59%

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 96%

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Judiciaries in corrupt societies

Priks

2010

Econ Gov

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“…For instance, attractiveness increases the candidate's number of votes and thereby the likelihood of being elected (Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara (2010) and Rosar, Klein, and Beckers (2008)). Antonakis and Dalgas (2009) suggest that underlying the effect of physical attractiveness is the voters' belief that attractive candidates are more competent.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Facing a Dilemma: Cooperative Behavior and Beauty

Darai

Grätz

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper investigates the influence of physical attractiveness on cooperative behavior. We survey data from 211 episodes of a television game show and combine it with independent facial attractiveness ratings of the show's contestants. The final of the show represents a simultaneous one-shot modified prisoner's dilemma. Our results show that facially attractive contestants provoke cooperative behavior from their counterparts, but attractive contestants themselves do not behave differently from unattractive ones. This preferential treatment or "beauty premium" rewards attractive contestants with substantially higher monetary gains of up to £2 153. This finding applies to both sexes. But, the attractiveness effect is limited to mixed-gender interactions. Contestants are only more cooperative when facing an attractive fellow player of the opposite sex. Attractiveness also has no effect in group-decisions made by the contestants prior to the prisoner's dilemma. Therefore people seem to show a preference to cooperate with someone towards whom they are personally attracted; and this preference reaches full effect when people lack other information on which to base their decision. Terms of use: Documents in

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