The Longest Negotiation: British Policy, IRA Strategy and the Making of the Northern Ireland Peace Settlement

Abstract

This article offers a new analysis of the Northern Ireland peace settlement through an examination of the pivotal relationship between two key actors: the British state and the Provisional Republican movement that included Sinn Féin and the IRA. It traces the negotiating relationship between these key parties and argues that the ending of violent conflict in the 1990s can best be understood as the outcome of a long bargaining process between these two actors that was conducted both tacitly and explicitly over a span of more than two decades. It concludes that the development of a cooperative relationship between the British state and the Provisional leadership and the active coordination of British policy and republican strategy were the crucial elements in securing an end to violence in the 1990s.

Rebel financing and the commitment problem in civil conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

“…So continuing the con ‡ict in 1973 was essentially the choice of the loyalist community. The British government would have been unwilling and/or unable to force an agreement without the cooperation of reactionary Unionism and so ensued the 'Long War'despite an IRA cease-…re in 1975 (Ó Dochartaigh, 2015). In terms of the theory presented here, we argue that the Unionist community in 1973 believed that there would be a large and exogenous increase in Republican power and would rather engage in con ‡ict despite the costs than concede to a much more unfavourable settlement in the future.…”

“…This seems unlikely as the primary explanation given how much would have been known to each side regarding their respective capabilities, although we do not rule out that it played a partial role in fuelling con ‡ict. Ó Dochartaigh (2015) argues that the IRA cease-…re in 1975 was made to signal their willingness to compromise but was interpreted by Britain as weakness and that the IRA could be easily defeated. The problem with this explanation is that it suggests an appetite for con ‡ict within the British political establishment which is highly questionable and ignores the role of reactionary Unionism.…”

Terrorism, counterterrorism and ‘the rule of law’: state repression and ‘shoot-to-kill’ in Northern Ireland

“…For example, in 1971 internment without trial was introduced in Northern Ireland for the fourth time in the 20th century (Beggan 2006;Bell 1993;De Fazio 2018). These efforts were complemented by political initiatives that included negotiations with various Irish governments, the Sunningdale Agreement (1973), which led to the brief establishment of communal powersharing , and a Provisional IRA-British truce in 1975 (English 2003;Ó Dochartaigh 2015). Over time the security forces became more sophisticated and discerning (see Table 3).…”

The Troubles in Northern Ireland and theories of social movements

“…Primary sources that inform the chapter also include documentation on the IRA's goals and negotiating positions over the course of the conflict drawn from private papers and state archives. Sources are described in more detail in Ó Dochartaigh (1999Ó Dochartaigh ( , 2005Ó Dochartaigh ( , 2011Ó Dochartaigh ( , 2015.…”