The Logical Burdens of Proof. Assertion and Hypothesis

Abstract

Abstract. The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) justification. In a first, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent from justification and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second, antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justification and results in two logical systems of information and justification: AR4 and AR 4 , respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a wide variety of epistemic norms. After comparing the different norms of justification involved in these logical systems, two hexagons expressing Aristotelian relations of opposition will be gathered in order to clarify how (a fragment of) pragmatic formulas can be interpreted in a fuzzy-based question-answer semantics.

Is ‘No’ a Force-Indicator? Yes, Sooner or Later!

“…According to Rumfitt, this should be taken to formally capture the English language form of a question-forming sentence p?, with the answer "yes" or "no". 2 As such, rejectivism is not merely supposed to be a formal account, but also to capture something of ordinary linguistic practice.…”

“…That is: any judgment embedded into another judgment turns into a sentence, whilst the entire judgment still makes sense. 9 For a corresponding account of truth and falsity, see [2].…”