The Logic of the Survival of North Korea

Abstract

Why has North Korea been able to survive up to now, while other rogue states such as Afghanistan and Iraq have suffered military intervention by the USA? To solve this puzzle, we present a simple two-level game model that takes into account strategic interdependence between intrastate and interstate wars. Using the two-level game framework, we show that the ethnic homogeneity of North Korea helps defend itself from US armed intervention, whereas a rogue state with a relatively heterogeneous society is expected to experience international insecurity by providing the USA with an opportunity to find domestic allies that help it win an interstate war against the rogue state. As a policy implication, we discuss the possibility that the recent development of a market economy in North Korea might destabilize the peace between the USA and North Korea.

North Korea: Editors’ Overview

“…Hirose and Kurizaki () investigate the reason North Korea has survived despite its enduring rogue state status. They present a two‐level game model to explain that the USA does not have a strong incentive for military wars against North Korea.…”

Comment on “The Logic of the Survival of North Korea”

“…Hirose and Kurizaki () clarify the logic of the survival of NK by focusing on its ethnic homogeneity. They present a two‐level game model that considers the interactions between domestic and international conflicts, in which not only the relationship between NK and the US, but also that between NK and opposition groups in the state are considered.…”

Comment on “The Logic of the Survival of North Korea”

“…As the title of their paper demonstrates, Hirose and Kurizaki () deal with the question, what is “the logic of the survival of North Korea,” that is, why has North Korea survived? Hirose and Kurizaki approach the question in the context of the United States (US) military intervention policy toward “rogue states.” Why has the USA, so far, chosen not to seek regime change in North Korea through military intervention such as it did with the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions in 2001 and 2003, respectively?…”

“…The lack of a subtitle, however, makes it difficult for the reader to grasp the uniqueness of Hirose and Kurizaki's approach. They provide a theoretical model for analyzing relations between the US and “rogue states” as a “two‐level game model” (see Figure 2 in Hirose & Kurizaki, ). In this model, they frame the US–North Korea conflict as a “game of strategic interdependence between interstate and intrastate war.” Using this model, Hirose and Kurizaki have shed light on the complex nature of the US–North Korea conflict: relations not only at the US–DPRK interstate level that focuses on deterrence, but also interaction at the intrastate level, that is, the nexus between the US and “oppositions groups” within the rogue state which would be “potential allies” or “informal allies” that would determine the likelihood of military intervention.…”

“…This, however, is not due to an increase in ethnic diversity, but rather the rise of market economy (Haggard & Noland, ). Hirose and Kurizaki () conclude that recent developments of the market economy increase the relative power of domestic opposition groups, but whether this would “increase” the risk of US military intervention needs more examination. The US may choose to promote regime transformation or regime change by other means.…”