The Logic of Kidnapping in Civil War: Evidence from Colombia

Abstract

Why do some armed groups kidnap for ransom? Despite a dramatic spike in kidnappings by political groups over the last several decades, there are scant existing explanations for why groups use this tool of coercion. Leveraging evidence from extensive interviews with former combatants from Colombia’s civil war, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as military and security personnel, I show that ransom kidnapping is used to enforce groups’ protection rackets, their main source of funding. Kidnapping is both the most lucrative way to punish tax evasion and an effective means of deterring future shirking. Thus, groups that tax local populations are more likely to kidnap; groups relying on external or voluntary forms of funding are less likely to take hostages. This article explains when we should see kidnapping in armed conflict, describing an underexplored way that selective violence bolsters insurgency.

Contestation, Governance, and the Production of Violence Against Civilians: Coercive Political Order in Rural Colombia

“…We refer to this use of coercion as "governing violence." Governing violence aims not to punish defection or other conflict-related offenses, but to enforce the group's vision of law and social order (Bateson 2021;Gilbert 2022;Jung and Cohen 2020;Lebas 2013;Lessing 2021;Moncada 2017;Phillips 2017). Governing violence is most frequently exercised to adjudicate everyday crimes common in court systems around the world, like land disputes, robberies, and murders.…”

“…Groups frequently commit violence aimed at social control despite not facing a local competitive threat. To enforce taxation, Colombia’s FARC and ELN both kidnapped civilians to dissuade noncompliance (Gilbert 2022). A staple of Shining Path’s governance in Peru was popular committees, in which mixed civilian-combatant councils tried cases of individuals the group deemed class enemies.…”

“…This coercion seeks to both enforce basic law and order, and as outlined above, to punish certain types of transgressions or target certain groups of people due to either the group’s ideology or popular demands. We refer to this use of coercion as “governing violence.” Governing violence aims not to punish defection or other conflict-related offenses, but to enforce the group’s vision of law and social order (Bateson 2021; Gilbert 2022; Jung and Cohen 2020; Lebas 2013; Lessing 2021; Moncada 2017; Phillips 2017). Governing violence is most frequently exercised to adjudicate everyday crimes common in court systems around the world, like land disputes, robberies, and murders.…”

Beyond Ransom and Political Concessions? Explaining Changes in Insurgents’ Kidnapping Involvement Versus Event-frequency

“…There is growing evidence documenting the use of kidnappings by violent political actors for purposes unrelated to negotiation, such as to compel compliance with regular extortion-taxation schemes (Gilbert 2020(Gilbert , 2022Koseli et al 2021), to forcefully recruit soldierssometimes children (Cohen 2013;Dunn 2004;Smith 2015), or to exploit local women for sexual and labor against their will (Cetorelli et al 2017;Kachynova 2015;Zenn and Pearson 2014). This body of evidence points to a possible link between insurgents' kidnappings and their assertion of coercive control over the local population in a state-like status.…”

Getting away with it? Kleptocracy, atrocities, and the morality of autocratic exile

“… 41 For the case, see Weber 2011. For the latest account of the political significance of kidnapping for ransom, see Gilbert 2022.…”