The logic of ‘being informed’ revisited and revised

Allo, Patrick

doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9516-1

Cited by 12 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…The first notion has actually given rise to a broad literature, which takes the name of theory of information (e.g. Allo (2011);Floridi and D'agostino (2009);Primiero (2007)). The second notion has been mostly ignored by the philosophical tradition.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are the Validities of Modal Logic Analytic? Or Analyticity Again, through Information, Proof, Modal Logic and Hintikka

Poggiolesi¹

2015

philosophiascientiae

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are the Validities of Modal Logic Analytic? Or Analyticity Again, through Information, Proof, Modal Logic and Hintikka

Poggiolesi¹

2015

philosophiascientiae

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“…See Allo (2011) andHalpern and Pucella (2007), Halpern and Rêgo (2008) for recent overviews. On awareness, the interested reader can consult Burkhard Schipper's bibliography Schipper (2012).…”

Section: The Formalmentioning

confidence: 99%

You Better Play 7: Mutual versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-Link Experiment

2012

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This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoffdominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of efficient equilibrium play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient to significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 induces, under suitable conditions, successful coordination more frequently than common knowledge. * University of Perugia, Via Pascoli 20, 06123 Perugia. † Scuola Normale Superiore, Piazza dei Cavalieri 7, 56100 Pisa and LSE Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London WC2A 2AE ‡ Corresponding author. Scuola Normale Superiore, Piazza dei Cavalieri 7, 56100 Pisa. 1 Epistemic attitudes: The formal and the experimentalThe purpose of this paper is to discuss-from the point of view of formal epistemology-some experimental results on the role of common knowledge as a coordination device in a weak-link coordination game. Common knowledge has long been regarded as a fundamental component in the modeling of rational interaction. As such it features prominently, though informally, in Nash's characterization of equilibrium. As game theory evolved towards capturing increasingly more refined solution concepts, common knowledge was there to stay as a fundamental modeling assumption. Harsanyi and Selten, to mention a particularly relevant example from the point of view of the present paper, put forward a view according to which the assumption of common knowledge of the players' rationality is sufficient to ensure the joint selection of efficient equilibria in (non-pure) coordination games.In a line of research which for a long time has been developed almost independently of the game-theoretic one, epistemic logicians have advanced, over the past two decades, rigorous characterizations of the epistemic attitudes of both individual and group knowledge and belief. The emergence of multi-agent epistemic logic thus enabled, around mid 1990s, the development of rigorous analyses of the epistemic conditions underlying game theoretic solution concepts.The ensuing investigations on the connection between rational agents' epistemic attitudes and their strategic behavior tended to fall into two seldom communicating categories, the formal and the experimental. This paper constitutes an attempt at fostering the cross-fertilization between those lines of research. It aims at so doing by taking full advantage...

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“…He argues that we should reject information closure, that is, the distributive thesis according to which, if a is informed both that p and that p→q then a is also informed that q . As Patrick Allo kindly reminded me, in general the problem is (at least) twofold (see Allo forthcoming). One might wish to reject information closure…”

Section: Comments and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Philosophy of Information: Ten Years Later

Floridi

2010

Metaphilosophy

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This article provides replies to, and comments on, the contributions to the special issue on the philosophy of information. It seeks to highlight convergences and points of potential agreement, while offering clarifications and further details. It also answers some criticisms and replies to some objections articulated in the special issue. This is a collection of very fine essays. Their scope, depth, and insightfulness are testimonies not only to the brilliance and scholarship of their authors but also to the remarkable maturity reached by the philosophy of information (PI) during the past decade. In the late 1990s, I was searching for an approach to some key philosophical questions: the nature of knowledge, the structure of reality, the uniqueness of human consciousness, a satisfactory way of dealing with the new ethical challenges posed by information and communication technologies, to list some of the topics discussed in this collection. I had in mind a way of doing philosophy that could be rigorous, rational, and conversant with our scientific knowledge, in line with the best examples set by the analytic tradition; non-psychologistic, in a Fregean sense; capable of dealing with contemporary and lively issues about which we really care; and less prone to metaphysical armchair speculations and idiosyncratic intuitions. I was looking for a constructive philosophy that would provide answers, not just analyses, that would be as free as possible from a self-indulgent, anthropocentric obsession with us and our super-duper role in the whole universe, and respectfully sceptical of commonsensical introspections and Indo-European linguistic biases. It was a recipe for disaster, but then, sometimes, fortune favours the irresponsible. During that period of intellectual struggle and confusion, I realised one day that what I had in mind was really quite simple: a philosophy grounded on the concept of information. I was not on my way to Damascus but in Oxford, at Wolfson College, sitting on the bank of the river Cherwell, when I r

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The logic of ‘being informed’ revisited and revised

Cited by 12 publications

References 18 publications

Are the Validities of Modal Logic Analytic? Or Analyticity Again, through Information, Proof, Modal Logic and Hintikka

Are the Validities of Modal Logic Analytic? Or Analyticity Again, through Information, Proof, Modal Logic and Hintikka

You Better Play 7: Mutual versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-Link Experiment

The Philosophy of Information: Ten Years Later

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