The Logic and Meaning of Plurals. Part II

Yi, Byeong-uk

doi:10.1007/s10992-005-9015-6

Cited by 69 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…I should also warn the reader that I henceforth employ (both first-order and propositional) plural logic without shame, but will explain the basics along the way. For more details on first-order plural logic, see Boolos (1986), Yi (2005Yi ( , 2006 or Oliver and Smiley (2013). 7 Following Rosen (2010), I here assume the so-called predicate approach rather than the so-called operator approach, and I assume that grounding is factive.…”

Section: Pannormismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormism

Bøhn

2017

Synthese

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In this paper, I will give an argument for what I call pannormism, the view according to which if x instantiates a metaphysically basic normative property F, then whatever grounds the being of x also instantiates F. In slogan form: if there is normativity, there is normativity all the way down. Such pannormism is in many ways analogous to panpsychism, and my discussion also contains an important lesson for panpsychism, a way to avoid its so-called combination problem. In Sect. 1, I present the argument; in Sect. 2, I discuss its conclusion.

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Section: Pannormismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormism

Bøhn

2017

Synthese

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“…Thus, strong CAI needs to get rid of absolute ≺, by relativizing it, already in order to avoid Collapse, quite independently of the problems about the paraphrases of cardinality ascriptions. 22 Bøhn himself refers to Yi (2005Yi ( , 2006) "for the details of plural logic I employ" (Bøhn 2014, p. 144, n. 3), and in these works Yi defines plural identity through (Plural Identity-Definition) (Yi, 2005, p. 487;2006, p. 243), and writes that "is one of is essential to analysing the plural cousin of the identity predicate" (Yi 2005, p. 488). 23 See, in particular, Calosi (2016) and Calosi (n.d.) for an accurate analysis of the disastrous impact of the Collapse on CAI.…”

Section: Relativizing Is One Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Composition and Relative Counting

Carrara

Lando

2017

Dialectica

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According to the so-called strong variant of Composition as Identity (CAI), the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals can be extended to composition, by resorting to broadly Fregean relativizations of cardinality ascriptions. In this paper we analyze various ways in which this relativization could be achieved. According to one broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about objects, while concepts occupy an additional argument place. It should be possible to paraphrase the cardinality ascriptions in plural logic and, as a consequence, relative counting requires the relativization either of quantifiers, or of identity, or of the is one of relation. However, some of these relativizations do not deliver the expected results, and others rely on problematic assumptions. In another broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about concepts or sets. The most promising development of this approach is prima facie connected with a violation of the so-called Coreferentiality Constraint, according to which an identity statement is true only if its terms have the same referent. Moreovereven provided that the problem with coreferentiality can be fixedthe resulting analysis of cardinality ascriptions meets several difficulties.

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“…You might worry that including plural properties in your ontology requires significant revision to your logic. However, as Byeong‐Uk Yi (, , , ) and others have demonstrated, we can accommodate plural properties simply with the introduction of plural quantifiers and plural predicates to elementary logic (PFO+). Given the relative ease with which such predicates can be accommodated, I don't think there's any sustainable objection to effect that the very idea plural properties is confused, or that formulating a theory in a language that contains plural predicates would be overly arduous or unattractively revisionary.…”

Section: The Plural Instantiation Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Emergence for Nihilists

Caves

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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I defend mereological nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects, against a challenge from ontological emergence, the view that some things have properties that are 'something over and above' the properties of their parts. As the nihilist does not believe in composite wholes, there is nothing in the nihilist's ontology to instantiate emergent properties -or so the challenge goes. However, I argue that some simples (taken together) can collectively instantiate an emergent property, so the nihilist's ontology can in fact accommodate emergent properties. Furthermore, I show that employing plural instantiation does not bloat the nihilist's ontology or ideology. The argument from ontological emergenceHere I defend mereological nihilism against a challenge from ontological emergence. §1 briefly explains nihilism and ontological emergence then outlines the argument against nihilism from the existence of emergent properties (the No Bearers argument). In §2 I argue that the best solution is for the nihilist to employ plural instantiation, holding that emergent properties are collectively instantiated by multiple simples. §3 weighs up the ontological and ideological cost of introducing plural quantification -necessary for making sense of plural instantiation -into the nihilist's theory. I conclude that the cost is negligible and so does not negate any of the claimed ontological or ideological parsimony advantages of nihilism. §4 defends and elaborates my views on ideological parsimony employed in the previous section, while §5 clarifies how my Plural Instantiation Strategy advances the debate and defends the strategy against an objection from the unity of consciousness.Suppose we have good reason to believe that wholes have novel properties over and above the properties of their parts. Next suppose -in a drive for ontological austerity, perhaps -that we get rid of the wholes from our Pacific Philosophical Quarterly •• (2015) ••-••

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The Logic and Meaning of Plurals. Part II

Cited by 69 publications

References 7 publications

Normativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormism

Normativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormism

Composition and Relative Counting

Emergence for Nihilists

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