The Lockean Prerogative, Natural Law, and Political Power

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Lockean prerogative power is political and not natural. After introducing two arguments in favour of the notion of prerogative as a natural power I offer two arguments contra this view. First, I claim that Locke’s conception of executive power is not unitary; rather, he distinguishes between natural and political executive power. Second, I distinguish two types of public good; the general public good and the specific public good. Drawing on these two distinctions, I respond to the arguments in favour of a natural prerogative and argue that they fail.

Locke on Prerogative

“…65 As Faulkner points out, prerogative is directly "at odds with Locke's elevation of law and legislature" over executive action. 66 For some, taking seriously chapter 14 reveals the Second Treatise to be even more internally inconsistent than has previously been suggested. 67 For others, though, prerogative is consistent with the rest of the treatise, though not with some of its modern interpretations as, once prerogative is properly put onto centre stage, many interpretations become untenable.…”