The Lock-In Effect of Capital Gains Taxation on Land Use

Yamazaki, Fukuju

doi:10.1006/juec.1996.0012

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Although a property tax on rent is generally neutral on land use, capital gains and bequest taxes are not neutral on resource allocation. See Yamazaki (1996Yamazaki ( , 1999.…”

Section: Compensation and Time Inconsistencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Preventive investment and relief spending for natural disasters: Why do rescue operations cause big spending for prevention?

Seshimo

Yamazaki

2018

Regional Science Policy & Practice

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This paper considers the locational decisions of residents in a small, open linear city at risk for natural disasters and analyses the relationship between disaster preventive investment as public goods and compensation by the government. Remarkably, the ex post optimal compensation policy, a type of fully covered compensation, makes the residential area more vulnerable to natural disasters. As a result, the ex post compensation policy requires excess preventive investment. External financing does not improve this problem and may actually exacerbate it. Based on these theoretical findings, we propose a socially optimal disaster policy to resolve these issues.

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“…Although a property tax on rent is generally neutral on land use, capital gains and bequest taxes are not neutral on resource allocation. See Yamazaki (1996Yamazaki ( , 1999.…”

Section: Compensation and Time Inconsistencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Preventive investment and relief spending for natural disasters: Why do rescue operations cause big spending for prevention?

Seshimo

Yamazaki

2018

Regional Science Policy & Practice

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“…We now consider the crucial assumptions about the rental market and asset market for land. Like Kanemoto (1992) and Yamazaki (1996), we assume that there is a competitive asset market for land; however, we assume there is no rental market for land and housing. This assumption is accurate for Japan, because of the``Shakuchi Shakka Hou'', mentioned above.…”

Section: A Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This asymmetric taxation of assets causes a distortion in land use only when there is no rental market for land. If there is a rental market, taxes on assets do not distort the equilibrium conditions in the rental market that determine the allocation of land (Iwata et al, 1993 andYamazaki, 1996). Iwata (1977) showed that a rental market for land and housing hardly exists in Japan because of the law on eviction control and rent control, the``Shakuchi Shakka Hou''.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Bequest Tax on Land Prices and Land Use

Yamazaki

1999

Japanese Econ Rev

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The paper examines whether bequest taxation affects land use, using an overlappinggenerations model. In Japan, in assessing land for the purpose of inheritance taxation, the assessed value is less than the market value; however, other assets are valued at market value. Such an asymmetry creates a greater incentive for the older generation to hold land, because the probability of decease is higher for older than younger persons. With constant technology available in each generation, the inheritance tax is found to lead to inef®cient land use, sluggish conversion of land over time and higher land prices. JEL Classi®cation Numbers: H24, R14.

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“…Therefore, following logic similar to Yamazaki's (1996) analysis of capital gains tax on development land, for risk-neutral producers the equilibrium value of quota must satisfy: 7 However, in selling the quota the inefficient producer forgoes quota rent with present value [P -C H Q ( Q/n -Q L )]/[1 + r].…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Asset market equilibrium must be such that there is indifference between (a) selling in year s, and (b) holding off the sale for a year, receiving a rent due to the ownership of quota for the production in the intervening year, hoping that supply control is not disbanded during the year, and then selling the quota in year s + 1. Therefore, following logic similar to Yamazaki's (1996) analysis of capital gains tax on development land, for risk-neutral producers the equilibrium value of quota must satisfy:…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quota Transfer Assessments and Efficiency

Roosen¹,

Hennessy²

1998

Canadian J Agri Economics

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In order to fund production/marketing quota redistributions or reduce the amount of quota outstanding, regulators often tax quota asset market trades. This assessment is shown to impede the transfer of quota to more efficient producers if rental markets are prohibited. Inefficient producers will produce too much, and the magnitude of cost inefficiencies will increase with the size of the assessment tax. Possible remedies to the problem are also discussed.Pour financer la distribution des quotas de production/marketing ou pour réduire la quantité de quotas, les organismes de contrôle taxent souvent les échanges mercantiles de produits soumis aux quotas. Il a été démontré que, si les marchés de location sont interdits, cette taxe empêche le transfert de quotas à des producteurs plus efficaces. Les producteurs peu efficaces produiront trop et l'ampleur de l'inefficacité-coût augmentera avec celle de la taxe sur les transferts. Les remèdes possibles à ce problème sont aussi étudiés dans cet article.

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The Lock-In Effect of Capital Gains Taxation on Land Use

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Preventive investment and relief spending for natural disasters: Why do rescue operations cause big spending for prevention?

Preventive investment and relief spending for natural disasters: Why do rescue operations cause big spending for prevention?

The Effects of Bequest Tax on Land Prices and Land Use

Quota Transfer Assessments and Efficiency

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